South Carolina Requests to Charge – Criminal
PART I GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS

§ 1-5 Reasonable Doubt

The State has the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. The State is required to prove every element of the charged offense by evidence which satisfies the jury of the guilt of the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant is not required to prove his innocence. The burden of proof always remains upon the State of South Carolina to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

What is a reasonable doubt in the law? A reasonable doubt is the kind of doubt that would cause a reasonable person to hesitate to act.

The term “reasonable doubt” should be given its plain and ordinary meaning.

The State has the burden of proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Some of you may have served as jurors in civil cases where you were told that it is only necessary to prove the fact is more likely true than not, such as by the greater weight or preponderance of the evidence. In criminal cases, the State’s proof must be more powerful than that. It must be beyond a reasonable doubt.

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced of the defendant’s guilt. There are very few things in this world that we know with absolute certainty. In criminal cases, the law does not require proof that overcomes every possible doubt. The law does not require that.

If, based on your consideration of the evidence, you are firmly convinced that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged, you must find him guilty. If on the other hand you conclude there is a real possibility that he is not guilty, you must give the defendant the benefit of the doubt and find the defendant not guilty.

• Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1 (1994) (finding Due Process Clause requires government to prove criminal defendant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and trial courts must avoid defining reasonable doubt so as to lead jury to convict on lesser showing than due process requires); Id. (explaining the charge defining reasonable doubt as a doubt that would cause a reasonable person to hesitate to act was a formulation which the Court had repeatedly approved); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (proclaiming the Due Process Clause mandates the government prove every element of the charged offense beyond a reasonable doubt).
• Todd v. State, 355 S.C. 396, 585 S.E.2d 305 (2003); State v. McHoney, 344 S.C. 85, 544 S.E.2d 30 (2001); State v. Jones, 343 S.C. 562, 578, 541 S.E.2d 813, 821 (2001) (“The Manning charge, although not required, is a correct statement of South Carolina law.”); State v. Aleksey, 343 S.C. 20, 538 S.E.2d 248 (2000) (stating jury instructions on reasonable doubt which charge jury to “seek the truth” are disfavored because they run the risk of unconstitutionally shifting the burden of proof to a defendant); State v. Needs, 333 S.C. 134, 508 S.E.2d 857 (1998) (urging trial courts to avoid using any “seek” language when charging jurors on reasonable doubt); Id. (identifying two appropriate ways to define reasonable doubt and noting that trial courts should rarely find it necessary to deviate from those approved charges); State v. Darby, 324 S.C. 114, 477 S.E.2d 710 (1996) (endorsing definition of reasonable doubt developed by the Federal Judicial Center and cited with approval in Justice Ginsberg’s concurring opinion in Victor v. Nebraska); State v. Adams, 322 S.C. 114, 470 S.E.2d 366 (1996) (determining trial court’s refusal to give reasonable doubt instruction requested by defendant, defining reasonable doubt as the kind of doubt that would cause a reasonable person to hesitate to act, did not constitute legal error); State v. Johnson, 315 S.C. 485, 487, 445 S.E.2d 637, 637 (1994) (“In Manning, we suggested that the trial bench give no further definition of reasonable doubt than that ‘a reasonable doubt is the kind of doubt that would cause a reasonable person to hesitate to act.’ We did not, however, mandate this charge. Moreover, in State v. Johnson, we noted that the phrase ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ without an explanation of its legal significance is much more favorable to a defendant than when amplified by an explanation and held that the court’s failure to define reasonable doubt was not error.”) (citations omitted); State v. Manning, 305 S.C. 413, 417, 409 S.E.2d 372, 375 (1991) (“[W]e are aware of the difficulty of defining reasonable doubt to a jury. We conclude the term ‘reasonable doubt’ may be best understood when the jury is simply instructed to give it its plain and ordinary meaning. In an abundance of caution, we suggest the trial bench give no further definition than that approved by the United States Supreme Court in Holland: A reasonable doubt is the kind of doubt that would cause a reasonable person to hesitate to act.”) (citation omitted); State v. Adkins, 353 S.C. 312, 577 S.E.2d 460 (Ct. App. 2003); State v. Lowery, 332 S.C. 261, 503 S.E.2d 794 (Ct. App. 1998); William Shepard McAninch & W. Gaston Fairey, The Criminal Law of South Carolina 74 (4th ed. 2002) (noting guarantee of protection of proof beyond reasonable doubt is core principle of America’s system of criminal justice); see also Brightman v. State, 336 S.C. 348, 352, 520 S.E.2d 614, 616 (1999) (“The King charge is unnecessary in light of the modern general reasonable doubt charge which instructs the jury to resolve doubts in favor of the defendant.”).

 

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