MN CRIMJIG 13.30 Assault in the Fourth Degree — On Firefighter, Emergency Medical Service Provider, School Official, Etc. — Elements

10 Minn. Prac., Jury Instr. Guides–Criminal CRIMJIG 13.30 (6th ed.)

September 2020 update

Part II. Specific Crimes

A. Crimes Against the Person

Chapter 13. Assault and Related Crimes Against the Person

CRIMJIG 13.30 Assault in the Fourth Degree — On Firefighter, Emergency Medical Service Provider, School Official, Etc. — Elements

The elements of assault in the fourth degree upon a _____ [Insert from list in CrimJIG 13.28] as alleged in this case are:

[Utilizing the numbers listed in CrimJIG 13.28]

[1] – [14] First, the defendant assaulted _____. [Insert CrimJIG 13.01 for assault with intent to cause fear. Insert CrimJIG 13.02 for assault — infliction of bodily harm. Insert both CrimJIG 13.01 and 13.02 if the assault charge is a combined intent to cause fear and infliction of bodily harm.1]

Second, the defendant inflicted demonstrable bodily harm upon _____. “Demonstrable bodily harm” means bodily harm that is capable of being perceived by a person other than the victim.

Third, _____ was _____ [insert from the list in CrimJIG 13.28] at the time of the assault.

[5] “School official” includes teachers, school administrators, and other employees of a public or private school;

[12] “Community crime prevention group” means a community group focused on community safety and crime prevention that: _____ [See M.S.A. § 609.2231(d)];

[13] “Reserve officer” means an individual whose services are utilized by a law enforcement agency to provide services including _____ [See M.S.A. § 626.84, subd. 1(e)];

[14] The meaning of “utility” includes _____ [See M.S.A. § 609.594, subd. 1(3)].

[5] Fourth, _____ was engaged in the performance of the duties of a school official at the time of the assault.

[6] – [11] Fourth, _____ was engaged in the performance of a duty mandated by law, court order, or ordinance at the time of the assault.

Fifth, the defendant knew that _____ was a public employee engaged in the performance of the official duties of the office.

[12] Fourth, _____ was engaged in neighborhood patrol duties at the time of the assault.

Fifth, the defendant should reasonably have known that _____ was a community crime prevention group member engaged in a neighborhood patrol.

[13] Fourth, _____ was engaged in the performance of official duties at the direction of, under the control of, or on behalf of a peace officer or supervising law enforcement officer or agency at the time of the assault.

Fifth, the defendant should reasonably have known that _____ was a reserve officer engaged in the performance of official public duties of the peace officer, or supervising law enforcement officer or agency.

[14] Fourth, _____ was engaged in the performance of the duties of an employee or contractor of a utility or the United States Postal Service at the time of the assault.

Fifth, the defendant should reasonably have known that _____ was an employee or contractor of a utility or the Postal Service who was performing the duties of employment or fulfilling contractual obligations.

[Fourth] [Fifth] [Sixth], the defendant’s act occurred on or about _____ in _____ County.

If you find that each of these elements has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant is guilty. If you find that any element has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant is not guilty.

COMMENT

M.S.A. § 609.2231, subds. 2, 2a, 5, 6, 7, 9, and 10

The definition of demonstrable bodily harm comes from State v. Backus, 358 N.W.2d 93 (Minn. App. 1984), although the Minnesota Court of Appeals noted that in the Committee’s previous comment (3rd Ed.) the term “demonstrable” was a word of common usage, but it was not error for the court to define it by use of a dictionary definition of the word “demonstrable.”

Footnotes

1. In State v. Dalbec, 789 N.W.2d 508 (Minn. App. 2010), the Minnesota Court of Appeals stated that intentionally inflicting bodily harm, attempting to inflict bodily harm, and acting with intent to cause fear are alternative means by which an assault may be committed. The court upheld a jury instruction which combined these alternative means into one instruction as against a challenge to the unanimity of the verdict. But the court also stated that the need for a combined instruction could be eliminated by charging these alternative means for committing an assault as separate counts and the Committee recommends that as the best approach.