

REPORT ON ALARMING TRENDS IN FBI SPECIAL AGENT RECRUITMENT AND SELECTION

FOR

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

AND

SELECT SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE WEAPONIZATION OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

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BY

A NATIONAL ALLIANCE OF RETIRED AND ACTIVE-DUTY FBI SPECIAL AGENTS AND ANALYSTS

OCTOBER 2023

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10	SEPT. 7, 2023	ROMEO PAPA 38	SIERRA 91	NORTHERN U.S.	67

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16	JULY 31, 2023	ROMEO PAPA 73	SIERRA 11	WESTERN U.S.	84
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20	AUGUST 7, 2023	ROMEO PAPA 38	SIERRA 17	NORTHERN U.S.	93
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I. REPORT ON FBI SPECIAL AGENT RECRUITMENT AND SELECTION

A. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. This Report on FBI Special Agent Recruitment and Selection is being presented by an Alliance of retired and active-duty FBI Special Agents and Analysts to the American people for full transparency and review.
2. This Report is also being presented with recommendations to the appropriate Congressional Committees responsible for oversight of the U.S. Department of Justice and the FBI.
3. Beginning in July 2023 and continuing through September 2023, the Alliance received detailed, anecdotal reporting on disturbing trends in FBI Special Agent Recruitment and Selection from more than 20 highly credible Sources and Sub-sources located in all quadrants of the country.
4. The Sources and Sub-sources are either retired from the FBI or are currently employed by the FBI, and many had direct access to and first-hand knowledge of the information they provided.
5. Their reporting collectively serves as the basis for the Key Findings in this Report. These findings are alarming, require immediate action, and corrective measures must begin without delay:

6. KEY FINDINGS

- a. **The law enforcement and intelligence capabilities of the FBI are degrading because the FBI is no longer hiring “the best and the brightest” candidates to fill the position of Special Agent of the FBI.**
- b. **An increasing number of lower quality candidates – described by one source as “bread crumbs” because they were rejected by other federal law enforcement agencies - are applying to become FBI Special Agents; and the FBI is selecting those candidates to become FBI Special Agents because they satisfy the FBI’s priority to meet Diversity, Equity and Inclusion (DEI) mandates.**
- c. **FBI Special Agent DEI hires are selected over other FBI Special Agent candidates who are more qualified based on criteria unrelated to DEI priorities.**

- d. FBI Special Agent Assessors who are responsible for evaluating FBI Special Agent candidates are themselves selected based on their propensity to prioritize diversity and inclusion over the qualifications of the applicants.**
- e. Based on direct evaluation and/or background investigations, some FBI Special Agent Applicant Coordinators at the Field Office level have attempted to discontinue the applications of candidates they believed were unqualified, only to be overruled by FBI Headquarters.**
- f. The FBI's Special Agent hiring numbers are down, likely due to the decline in the Nation's trust in the FBI and a corresponding decrease in the number of individuals interested in applying to the FBI for employment.**
- g. To more easily accommodate a larger pool of available applicants, FBI Special Agent hiring standards have been relaxed and requirements measurably lowered in categories that include physical fitness, illicit drug use, financial irregularities, mental health, full-time work experience, and integrity.**
- h. Conspicuously absent from the FBI's selection process is an agency-wide mandate to determine whether FBI Special Agent applicants can meet their moral and Constitutional obligations of equal justice and protection under the law and set aside their own political views and personal bias to conduct investigations fairly and without prejudice.**
- i. A number of reports from different parts of the country show new FBI Special Agents who complete New Agents Training at the FBI Academy arrive at their first FBI Field Offices with unacceptably poor writing skills.**
- j. The FBI Director's assertion that recruitment of FBI Special Agents is "going extremely well" contradicts first-hand reporting from the Field.**

B. INTRODUCTION

1. An Alliance of retired and active-duty FBI Special Agents and Analysts concerned about the FBI's degrading law enforcement and intelligence capabilities are reporting information suggesting FBI Headquarters and Field Office management are bypassing the institutional recruitment regimen of spotting and assessing qualified FBI Special Agent candidates necessary to address National Security threats to the United States and focusing instead on meeting recent "woke" recruitment measures defined in Diversity, Equity and Inclusion (DEI) priorities.
2. The United States is confronted by a myriad of complex threats including international terrorism, cyber, weapons of mass destruction, human trafficking, corruption, illegal narcotics, black market organ harvesting, and corporate and foreign espionage.
3. Meeting these complex threats requires FBI Special Agents to be of the highest intellectual, physical and moral caliber because adversaries including transnational criminal organizations and countries such as China, Russia, Iran, Cuba, and Venezuela are working together and in conjunction with other transnational terrorist and criminal organizations to target the United States.
4. Today's FBI – historically, the premier law enforcement and domestic intelligence agency – known for neutralizing the likes of spies from State/Non-state actors, dismantling Al-Qaeda networks and ceasing transnational drug operations perpetrated by organized crime, lacks the fortitude and skills warranted to defeat these threats in adversarial trenches, in cyber space, and in our own backyard. And if the current trajectory of FBI Special Agent recruitment and selection continues – using DEI as the primary and sole measure – our homeland security efforts will be significantly hampered.¹

¹ See Section II: Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources, for reporting by SIERRA 15, pages 65-66.

C. SUPPORT FOR DIVERSITY

1. The Alliance of retired and active-duty FBI Special Agents and Analysts includes minorities - men and women – who have served in FBI Field Offices throughout the United States and at FBI Headquarters in Washington, D.C.
2. The Alliance fully supports a diverse workplace.
3. The Alliance believes the FBI cannot, however, continue to hire applicants to fill Special Agent positions based primarily on the applicants' race, gender, and/or sexual orientation simply "to build a workforce that reflects the communities that we work to serve and protect."²
4. Only the best, most qualified applicants, regardless of their race, gender, and/or sexual orientation, must be selected to become Special Agents of the FBI based on:
 - a. The content of their character, maturity, initiative, intellect, critical and creative thinking, sound judgement, exceptional drive to maintain a high level of physical fitness, and
 - b. Any other combination of the hard and soft skills every elite investigator must possess to faithfully defend the Constitution, effectively respond to the needs of the American public, and tackle the challenges posed by a wide variety of ever-evolving threat priorities.

D. SOURCES AND METHODOLOGY

1. On June 13, 2023, the Alliance received preliminary reporting of troubling trends in FBI Special Agent recruitment and selection.
2. To validate these initial reports, the Alliance issued a Request For Information (RFI) on July 8, 2023.³ The RFI was issued nationwide to a select group of trusted security, intelligence and law enforcement professionals and others bound by their direct connection to the FBI.
3. No law enforcement sensitive or classified information was requested or received.

² "Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion," Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI JOBS, accessed September 19, 2023, <https://fbijobs.gov/diversity>.

³ See Appendix C: Request For Information (RFI), dated July 8, 2023, pages 109-111.

4. In response to the RFI, highly credible reporting – much of it independently corroborated - was received beginning on July 8, 2023 from Sources and Sub-sources with direct access to and first-hand knowledge of FBI recruitment and selection matters.
5. The final report was received on September 7, 2023, bringing the total number of separate reports received to 23.
6. Because of the culture of censorship and retaliation within the FBI, the identities of the Sources and Sub-sources have not been made public. The sources would not have come forward if their identities were going to be disclosed, so code names were used to protect the identities of all parties, including the Reporting Persons.

E. FEAR OF RETALIATION

1. The need for this Report on FBI Special Agent Recruitment and Selection is critical and the timing for these public disclosures long overdue; and while admittedly not ideal for transparency, anonymity and the use of code names were necessary because contributors to this Report are fearful of retaliation by the FBI, including those who have retired from the FBI.
2. DYSFUNCTION AT THE FBI
 - a. Significant concerns raised at the Field Office level by FBI personnel who care deeply about the FBI's reputation, legacy and operational strength are routinely ignored, dismissed or unaddressed by the FBI's chain of command.
 - b. When FBI agents, analysts and support staff step forward to say something because they see something wrong with FBI policies and procedures, retaliation by FBI management is widely perceived throughout the workforce as devastating, swift and automatic.
 - c. The FBI has lost its way in a toxic culture of dysfunction, unwilling to listen to its own people, unable to find the courage to remedy recruitment and selection processes that have become self-destructive, and unashamed to pretend everything is just fine at the FBI.⁴

⁴ The authors of this Report believe the culture of dysfunction is so deeply embedded in the DNA of the FBI that they predict many of the most insecure, defensively minded in FBI Executive Management – bred to view any criticism as a threat to their next promotion - will label the collective group of Reporting Persons, Sources and Sub-sources cited in this Report as the enemy – indeed, as traitors - and attempt to identify and target them for investigation, intimidation and personal attacks rather than muster the honor, humility and self-awareness necessary to acknowledge failure and address the issues in service to the American people.

- d. Because of this dysfunction, the FBI is organizationally incapable of making the necessary course corrections on its own. The impetus for needed reform must, as a result, be forced on the FBI from outside the organization.

F. ALARMING TRENDS, IN THEIR OWN WORDS

1. SUBJECT MATTER EXPERTS

- a. The Sources and Sub-sources featured in this Report represent a full range of FBI Special Agent recruitment and selection Subject Matter Experts (SMEs), both active-duty and retired:
 - i. **FBI Field Office Special Agent APPLICANT COORDINATORS**
 - ii. **FBI Field Office Special Agent ASSESSORS**
 - iii. **FBI Academy New Agent Training Unit INSTRUCTORS**
 - iv. **FBI Academy New Agent Trainee CLASS COUNSELORS**
 - v. **FBI Field Office SUPERVISORS**
 - vi. **FBI Headquarters EXECUTIVE MANAGEMENT**
- b. Their reporting in full, raw form with available biographical data of the Reporting Persons, Sources and Sub-sources is provided later in this Report in Section II for the reader to evaluate.⁵
- c. Excerpts of their reporting are provided here, sorted for the reader in the following six (6) categories:

- i. **Lower Quality Candidates, Lower Standards, and a Coffee Shop Barista**
- ii. **Diversity, Equity and Inclusion; FBI Assessors; and a Lesson from the CIA**
- iii. **Historical Perspective & a Warning for Former FBI Director James Comey**
- iv. **Hand Holding and Physical Fitness Failures at the FBI**
- v. **Poor Writing Skills and Remedial English Classes**
- vi. **New Agent Trainees, Mental Health and Drama at the FBI Academy**

⁵ See Section II: Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources, pages 37-101.

- d. NOTE: The Reporting Persons, code name ROMEO PAPA, and Sources and Sub-sources, code name SIERRA, are listed for tracking purposes by number:

i. Lower Quality Candidates, Lower Standards, and a Coffee Shop Barista

ROMEO PAPA 14 ON SIERRA 87

SIERRA 87 served for more than 20 years in the FBI as a Special Agent and Recruitment Coordinator. ROMEO PAPA 14 has known SIERRA 87 for his/her entire career. SIERRA 87 was awarded multiple accolades and is known for his/her exemplary work ethic, attitude, and achievements. In spite of the politicization of the FBI, SIERRA 87 continues to have a deep love for the USA and FBI.

“SIERRA 87 believes that in general, the quality of FBI applicants is considerably lower and highly qualified candidates are going elsewhere. SIERRA 87 said there are a number of reasons the FBI is getting noticeably lower quality candidates: SIERRA 87 said the drug policy has been liberalized to include applicants who had a lifestyle of using drugs. The physical fitness test is easier, and candidates are required to pass it only once. Failure to adhere to financial responsibilities is no longer a disqualifier. A candidate who was arrested and fought with police officers was not disqualified. Candidates with Driving Under the Influence (DUI) convictions are not disqualified. People with a documented mental illness are not necessarily disqualified. Lack of candor is no longer a disqualifier. SIERRA 87 said there have been candidates he/she has documented as lying during different stages of the process, to include the Meet and Greet, but FBIHQ refused to disqualify them. FBIHQ forced the field to continue the application process.”⁶

⁶ See Section II: Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources, for reporting by SIERRA 87, page 40.

ROMEO PAPA 45 ON SIERRA 72

SIERRA 72 is a 15-plus year veteran of the Federal Bureau of Investigation who is leading a squad of FBI personnel as a Supervisory Special Agent (SSA). SIERRA 72 is a diligent, hard-working, and friendly individual who strives to serve and uphold the values of the United States. SIERRA 72 traveled overseas on multiple occasions to train allies in various law enforcement techniques.

“During the past six years, SIERRA 72 said there had been a noticeable drop in the quality of Agent candidates (referred to interchangeably as candidate or applicant). When he/she started as an assessor, candidates with questionable backgrounds impacting their integrity, drug use, or failing to pass PFT standards were quickly dismissed for consideration. Now, FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ) is dismissing negative reports provided by assessors when derogatory information is developed and ordering the continuation of candidates through the Agent application process. In one instance, SIERRA 72 reported that he/she disqualified a candidate because the candidate's only work experience was working two years as a coffee shop barista and having a bachelor's degree in art history. SIERRA 72 did not recommend this candidate because he/she believes the candidate is not as competitive as other candidates and did not have at least one year of full-time professional work experience. FBIHQ ordered SIERRA 72 to continue this applicant to the next stage in the Agent process.”⁷

ROMEO PAPA 14 ON SIERRA 51

SIERRA 51 is a 20-plus year veteran of the FBI who served as a Supervisory Special Agent, Phase II Assessor, and Applicant Coordinator. ROMEO PAPA 14 has known SIERRA 51 for ten years and knows SIERRA 51 to be honest and trustworthy. SIERRA 51 has a great, unblemished reputation at the FBI.

“SIERRA 51 thought the general concept of the applicant process worked based on checks and balances put into place (Phase I, Meet and Greet, Personal Security Interview, Phase II, Polygraph, Background Investigation), but FBIHQ would interfere with the process and ‘ram’ through certain applicants. SIERRA 51 was frustrated by the constant changes in the application process implemented by FBIHQ. The changes include drug policy, fitness requirements, applicant preferences, etc. SIERRA 51 said FBIHQ seemed to react to ‘bad numbers’ by immediately making policy and procedural changes without any long-term strategy.”⁸

⁷ See Section II: Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources, for reporting by SIERRA 72, page 43.

⁸ See Section II: Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources, for reporting by SIERRA 51, pages 45-46.

ROMEO PAPA 38 ON SIERRA 91

SIERRA 91 is a retired U.S. Government (USG) employee with over 25 years of federal service, including five years or more of supervisory and management experience in the military or intelligence sectors of the USG. SIERRA 91's experience includes tours in Washington, D.C. where he/she was involved in evaluating and hiring federal civil service employees and contractors.

"In April 2001, the FBI recruited under four entry programs: Law, Accounting, Language and Diversified. The 'Diversified' program's minimum standards, SIERRA 91 reported, included a Bachelor of Science or Bachelor of Arts degree in any discipline and three years of full-time work experience or an advanced degree and two years of full-time work experience. SIERRA 91 said that by May 2022, this requirement for FBI Special Agent applicants had been reduced to a college degree with only two years of full-time work experience and only one year of full-time work experience for holders of an advanced degree. In SIERRA 91's opinion, shortening the full-time work experience criteria made it more difficult for the FBI to properly evaluate how an applicant's abilities measure up to the FBI's current eight (8) published Core Competencies: Collaboration, Communication, Flexibility and Adaptability, Initiative, Interpersonal Ability, Leadership, Organizing and Planning, and Problem Solving and Judgment. SIERRA 91 stated that in many cases, deficiencies in these core competencies may not be apparent in only 24 months on the job, particularly entry-level positions held by candidates who are recruited and then apply for the position of FBI Special Agent."⁹

NOTE: Full details of the FBI's current Special Agent Selection System (SASS), including published eligibility and physical requirements, can be found at <https://fbijobs.gov/special-agents>.^{10, 11}

⁹ See Section II: Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources, for reporting by SIERRA 91, page 68.

¹⁰ See Appendix A: "Employment Eligibility," Federal Bureau of Investigation, downloaded September 10, 2023, https://fbijobs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-04/guide_eligibility.pdf, pages 102-103.

¹¹ See Appendix B: "Special Agent FAQ," Federal Bureau of Investigation, downloaded September 19, 2023, https://fbijobs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-03/Special_Agent_FAQ.pdf, pages 104-108.

ROMEO PAPA 39 ON SIERRA 28

SIERRA 28 is a 15-plus year veteran of the FBI with approximately a decade of experience as a New Agent Assessor conducting Phase 2 interviews. ROMEO PAPA 39 has known SIERRA 28 for approximately 12 years, and the two have discussed the Phase 2 process based on a mutual interest in the program. ROMEO PAPA 39 has no doubt about SIERRA 28's authenticity, trustworthiness, or competence.

"SIERRA 28 did not furnish specific examples but stated that it is rare for more recent (FBI Special Agent) applicants to receive 6's or 7's on the rating scale (of 1 for low all the way to 7 for high based on 7 category sets)...SIERRA 28 stated that it was not uncommon during his/her first few years as a New Agent Assessor (approximately a decade ago) to rate applicants with 6's and 7's. SIERRA 28 did not offer speculation regarding possible causes for the measurable decline of the applicants but agreed that the decision to lower the (pre-FBI) work requirement from three years to two was to increase the pool of candidates."¹²

ROMEO PAPA 25 ON SIERRA 77

SIERRA 77 is a 20-plus year veteran of the FBI who served in a variety of leadership roles. SIERRA 77 was known for his/her attention to detail and was highly respected as an agent. ROMEO PAPA 25 described SIERRA 77 as one of the most intelligent people he/she has ever met, and ROMEO PAPA 25 characterized SIERRA 77's credibility as beyond reproach.

"Speaking at length with ROMEO PAPA 25, SIERRA 77 said lower quality candidates are being hired by today's FBI to become FBI Special Agents, and SIERRA 77 said the issue is national in scope. SIERRA 77 further stated he/she learned from active-duty agents that applicants who have not achieved minimum physical fitness scores during testing in the Field are still allowed in today's FBI to advance in the hiring process and report to the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia for New Agents Training. SIERRA 77 said he/she was advised that when applicant coordinators and background investigators raised objections to allowing these applicants to move forward in the hiring process, they were overruled by FBI Headquarters...SIERRA 77 said lower qualified candidates are being hired by today's FBI to keep the numbers up. That's the only way SIERRA 77 could rationalize this trend."¹³

¹² See Section II: Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources, for reporting by SIERRA 28, pages 47-48.

¹³ See Section II: Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources, for reporting by SIERRA 77, pages 72-73.

ROMEO PAPA 21 ON SIERRA 32

SIERRA 32 is a veteran of the FBI who served for more than 20 years in major FBI Field Offices throughout the country. SIERRA 32 worked in a number of investigative and administrative areas, including work as an Undercover Agent. SIERRA 32 received numerous commendations for his/her dedicated FBI service from local, state, and federal law enforcement organizations.

SIERRA 32 also served in a supervisory role at the New Agents Training Unit (NATU), FBI Academy, Quantico, Virginia. During this time, SIERRA 32 had direct access to behavioral, performance-related, and other pertinent information regarding New Agent Trainees (NATs) and is in a unique position to provide both a historical and contemporary perspective on recruitment at the FBI.

“SIERRA 32 stated he/she spoke to an FBI recruiter whose identity was not disclosed. The recruiter advised SIERRA 32 that in the past, they (the recruiter and fellow recruiters) each had between 18 to 20 (applicant) cases. In the last couple of years, the case load, according to the recruiter, dropped down to between three and four cases, indicating a notable decrease in the number of candidates applying to the FBI. SIERRA 32 said recruiting is picking up now, but the caliber of recruits seems to have fallen. SIERRA 32 further stated the FBI does not appear to be getting experienced, ‘mature’ candidates, such as the former cop, former military person, the professional career person, the lawyer, accountant, or engineer.”¹⁴

ROMEO PAPA 19 ON SIERRA 67

SIERRA 67 served for more than 20 years as an FBI Special Agent and Supervisory Special Agent (SSA). SIERRA 67’s access to the information provided below is direct, and his/her reporting is considered, without question, reliable.

“SIERRA 67 learned that after all of the bad press the FBI received after James B. Comey became FBI Director (on September 4, 2013) and stories were published about Former FBI Deputy Director Andrew McCabe, Former FBI Attorney Lisa Page, Former FBI Deputy Assistant Director Peter Strzok and others, the applicant numbers decreased significantly while retirements increased.”¹⁵

¹⁴ See Section II: Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources, for reporting by SIERRA 32, page 79.

¹⁵ See Section II: Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources, for reporting by SIERRA 67, page 80.

ROMEO PAPA 45 SIERRA 23

SIERRA 23 has served for more than four years as a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is currently investigating terrorism matters. SIERRA 23 is an outstanding, hard-working, persistent, and diligent employee with high ethical standards. SIERRA 23 has a passion for serving our country.

“Since SIERRA 23 has become an Agent, he/she has observed that the FBI does not hire the best applicants or promote the best leaders. SIERRA 23 said the FBI is now a joke among other law enforcement agencies because of its apparent investigative failures, political targeting of certain individuals/groups, and woke adoption. SIERRA 23 said the FBI is considering hiring candidates not accepted by other law enforcement agencies. Specifically, Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) requires applicants who lateral over to its agency to have an Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA) vouch that an 1811 (Criminal Investigations Series) applicant has taken a case to trial as a major criterion for consideration. SIERRA 23 knows of new FBI Agents who were rejected by other law enforcement agencies for one reason or another but were able to become FBI Special Agents...SIERRA 23 said most of the Agents disappear during the day, go home early, or never want to work late for after-hours operations. SIERRA 23 does not trust most of the Agents with his/her life since they have questionable competence, tactical abilities, and work ethic. SIERRA 23 never expected the quality of the Agents and employees in his/her field office to be so low.”¹⁶

¹⁶ See Section II: Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources, for reporting by SIERRA 23, pages 90-92.

ROMEO PAPA 83 ON SIERRA 22

SIERRA 22 is a current employee of the FBI whose work assignments include handling FBI Applicant matters. ROMEO PAPA 83 said he/she has known SIERRA 22 for more than 30 years. SIERRA 22, according to ROMEO PAPA 83, is known in the office as a hard-working employee, and ROMEO PAPA 83 characterized SIERRA 22 as highly reliable and credible and in a position to know the information provided.

“SIERRA 22 said an individual who was recently rejected by a local police department because the individual was found to be unqualified applied for a non-Special Agent position with the FBI. FBI Headquarters, according to SIERRA 22, ordered the individual’s FBI applicant investigation to continue despite objections from the FBI Field Office to terminate the individual’s FBI application. SIERRA 22 further stated an individual in his/her 30s who has been unemployed for several years and described as a ‘gamer’ also applied to the FBI. FBI Headquarters, according to SIERRA 22, also ordered this individual’s FBI applicant investigation to continue despite objections from the FBI Field Office to terminate the individual’s FBI application.”¹⁷

¹⁷ See Section II: Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources, for reporting by SIERRA 22, page 95.

ii. Diversity, Equity and Inclusion; FBI Assessors; and a Lesson from the CIA

ROMEO PAPA 14 ON SIERRA 87

SIERRA 87 served for more than 20 years in the FBI as a Special Agent and Recruitment Coordinator. ROMEO PAPA 14 has known SIERRA 87 for his/her entire career. SIERRA 87 was awarded multiple accolades and is known for his/her exemplary work ethic, attitude, and achievements. In spite of the politicization of the FBI, SIERRA 87 continues to have a deep love for the USA and FBI.

“SIERRA 87 said recruiters are rated on their Performance Appraisals for hosting Diversity Applicant Recruitment (DAR) events. Invitations are only given to those in minority groups based on race, sexual orientation, etc. According to SIERRA 87, straight white males may not attend. If a recruiter chose NOT to attend a Pride Parade or fly the Pride flag, SIERRA 87 said the recruiter would most likely be removed immediately as the performance evaluation of the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) includes this participation.”¹⁸

ROMEO PAPA 45 ON SIERRA 72

SIERRA 72 is a 15-plus year veteran of the Federal Bureau of Investigation who is leading a squad of FBI personnel as a Supervisory Special Agent (SSA). SIERRA 72 is a diligent, hard-working, and friendly individual who strives to serve and uphold the values of the United States. SIERRA 72 traveled overseas on multiple occasions to train allies in various law enforcement techniques.

“SIERRA 72 believes in the FBI's mission, and SIERRA 72 said today's FBI is getting so political and woke that it is hurting the organization's ability to hire the best, most qualified candidates. It seems FBIHQ is more interested in hiring people of different colors, races, and sex than the best candidates who can serve as effective investigators.”¹⁹

¹⁸ See Section II: Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources, for reporting by SIERRA 87, page 41.

¹⁹ See Section II: Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources, for reporting by SIERRA 72, page 43.

ROMEO PAPA 14 ON SIERRA 87

SIERRA 87 served for more than 20 years in the FBI as a Special Agent and Recruitment Coordinator. ROMEO PAPA 14 has known SIERRA 87 for his/her entire career. SIERRA 87 was awarded multiple accolades and is known for his/her exemplary work ethic, attitude, and achievements. In spite of the politicization of the FBI, SIERRA 87 continues to have a deep love for the USA and FBI.

“Previously, once an agent was certified as an assessor, the agent remained an assessor unless removed for bad conduct, according to SIERRA 87. In about 2019, FBIHQ removed ALL assessors and, regardless of the number of years of experience serving as an assessor, all assessors had to reapply. The field office and FBIHQ decided whom to let back into the program. This was seen as an attempt to remove senior assessors and replace them with newer, ‘easier’ and more diverse assessors.”²⁰

ROMEO PAPA 62 ON SIERRA 41

SIERRA 41 is a minority and served for more than 20 years as an FBI Special Agent. He/she spent over 12 years working in the FBI applicant recruitment process. ROMEO PAPA 62 has known SIERRA 41 for SIERRA 41’s entire career in the FBI, and ROMEO PAPA 62 characterizes SIERRA 41 as highly consistent, reliable, and credible.

“SIERRA 41 said FBI assessors are selected based on their propensity to prioritize diversity and inclusion over qualifications of the applicants. SIERRA 41 said this even applies to minority agents who request to become FBI assessors. There was, according to SIERRA 41, a time when FBI assessors went through a renewal process to retain their positions as assessors. SIERRA 41 said the process appeared to weed out agents who prioritized the quality of candidates over diversity and inclusion, and this also applied to an assessor if he/she was a minority.”²¹

²⁰ See Section II: Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources, for reporting by SIERRA 87, page 39.

²¹ See Section II: Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources, for reporting by SIERRA 41, page 54.

ROMEO PAPA 19 ON SIERRA 67

SIERRA 67 served for more than 20 years as an FBI Special Agent and Supervisory Special Agent (SSA). SIERRA 67's access to the information provided below is direct, and his/her reporting is considered, without question, reliable.

"SIERRA 67 said for each New Agents Class (at the FBI Academy), a Class Leader was selected by the Class Staff. SIERRA 67 said there was pressure or an attempt to choose a minority NAT (New Agent Trainee) for the Class Leader to emphasize Diversity and Inclusion, but it could not be obvious. For instance, according to SIERRA 67, if there were no minorities in the class who passed the first Physical Fitness Test (PFT), they could not be chosen as the Class Leader. However, if the choice was between two NATs and one was a minority, the minority would be chosen."²²

ROMEO PAPA 41 ON SIERRA 15

SIERRA 15 has spent more than three decades working to counter threats to U.S. National Security interests, defend clients in the private sector against insider threats and espionage, and provide training as a certified instructor on intelligence and law enforcement matters. SIERRA 15 is an intelligence and security professional who as a proven leader served with distinction in the U.S. Intelligence Community. SIERRA 15's credibility is, without question, reliable, and he/she had direct access to the information detailed below.

"SIERRA 15 stated that unlike today's FBI where current Special Agent recruitment priorities appear to focus on fulfilling Diversity, Equity and Inclusion (DEI) mandates, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) remains committed to recruiting Clandestine Officers based on Threat Priorities, including Transnational Threats...It is imperative, according to SIERRA 15, that the FBI recruit Special Agent applicants based on current threat priorities as outlined in the 56 quarterly FBI Domain Intelligence Reports, in addition to amplifying a robust intelligence cadre of field analysts that will accommodate the necessary requirement of operational cases. SIERRA 15 recommended the FBI move away from a centralized mind think of headquarters policy and return to a decentralized operational setting that would enable the FBI to remain agile in addressing the liquid Transnational Threat."²³

²² See Section II: Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources, for reporting by SIERRA 67, page 82.

²³ See Section II: Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources, for reporting by SIERRA 15, pages 63, 66.

iii. Historical Perspective & a Warning for Former FBI Director James Comey

ROMEO PAPA 83 ON SIERRA 47

SIERRA 47 is a highly decorated veteran of the FBI whose career spanned four decades. Well-respected by his/her peers in the law enforcement and intelligence communities, SIERRA 47 retired from the FBI following a distinguished career and transitioned into the private sector to (1) provide wide-ranging consulting services and (2) leadership defending U.S. National Security Interests against hostile and foreign threats.

SIERRA 47's historical perspective on FBI recruitment is based on first-hand personal and professional observations, and his/her reporting is considered highly reliable.

"SIERRA 47 believed the FBI's transformation of its recruitment priorities was intentional and that it began with Former FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III (who served in that capacity from September 4, 2001 to September 4, 2013). Priorities were intentionally designed, according to SIERRA 47, to change the 'cowboy' culture of the FBI. SIERRA 47 said that initially, the focus was to expand the Bureau's relationships with universities, colleges, and businesses, specifically through the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University headquartered in Evanston, Illinois. SIERRA 47 further stated Director Mueller's successor, Former FBI Director James B. Comey (who served in that capacity from September 4, 2013 to May 9, 2017) accelerated those relationships. SIERRA 47 said Directors Mueller and Comey, along with current FBI Director Christopher Wray (whose tenure as Director began on August 2, 2017), encouraged the FBI's move towards Gay Pride celebrations inside the FBI and eventually the full adoption of Diversity, Equity and Inclusion (DEI) to guide the FBI's hiring of personnel and promotion. SIERRA 47 said FBI employees warned Director Comey that the FBI was placed on the wrong course by Director Mueller. That warning came in the form of a letter, dated July 16, 2013, authored by an FBI agent described by SIERRA 47 as very credible, and signed by hundreds of Bureau employees. SIERRA 47 said Director Comey completely ignored the letter."²⁴

²⁴ See Section II: Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources, for reporting by SIERRA 47, pages 55-56.

iv. Hand Holding and Physical Fitness Failures at the FBI

ROMEO PAPA 45 ON SIERRA 72

SIERRA 72 is a 15-plus year veteran of the Federal Bureau of Investigation who is leading a squad of FBI personnel as a Supervisory Special Agent (SSA). SIERRA 72 is a diligent, hard-working, and friendly individual who strives to serve and uphold the values of the United States. SIERRA 72 traveled overseas on multiple occasions to train allies in various law enforcement techniques.

“...SIERRA 72 disqualified another applicant because she was more than 50 pounds overweight using the FBI's body fat index and could not pass the PFT (Physical Fitness Test). FBIHQ again ordered SIERRA 72 to continue this candidate's application package. This particular candidate was an African American female who told SIERRA 72 that she ‘hates working out and was never active.’ SIERRA 72 told the applicant that maintaining a level of physical fitness is part of the job of being an Agent, and it is a good way to maintain a better quality of life.”²⁵

ROMEO PAPA 39 ON SIERRA 64

SIERRA 64 is a 15-plus year veteran of the FBI with previous experience as a Supervisory Special Agent and more recently as an Applicant Coordinator with direct access to the information provided.

ROMEO PAPA 39 has known SIERRA 64 for approximately 15 years. The two share similar backgrounds and have been work colleagues and friends. ROMEO PAPA 39 has no doubt about SIERRA 64's authenticity, trustworthiness, or competence.

“During casual conversation, SIERRA 64 lamented the overall lack of physical fitness among the applicant pool. SIERRA 64 did not cite specific data, but he/she witnessed a high percentage of failures during his/her time as Applicant Coordinator on the entry standards for the FBI's Physical Fitness Test (PFT). SIERRA 64 has seen on more than one occasion, an applicant receive a score of negative 2, the lowest possible score. Other times, applicants have simply quit in the middle of the 1.5-mile run.”²⁶

²⁵ See Section II: Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources, for reporting by SIERRA 72, page 43.

²⁶ See Section II: Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources, for reporting by SIERRA 64, page 49.

ROMEO PAPA 89 ON SIERRA 55

SIERRA 55 has served as an FBI Special Agent for approximately a decade, with experience working criminal and intelligence matters. ROMEO PAPA 89 has worked directly with SIERRA 55, and ROMEO PAPA 89 has known SIERRA 55 for a total of more than five years. ROMEO PAPA 89 described SIERRA 55 as reliable and squared away, and SIERRA 55's access to the information detailed below is direct based on SIERRA 55's role as an FBI Special Agent Recruiter.

"SIERRA 55 said physical fitness requirements have changed for applicants. Currently, an FBI Special Agent applicant can score as low as a nine (9) prior to going to the FBI Academy where the minimum passing score is twelve (12). SIERRA 55 said FBI Special Agent applicants can score a zero (0) in a physical fitness event."²⁷

ROMEO PAPA 24 ON SIERRA 35

SIERRA 35 served for more than 20 years as an FBI Special Agent and enjoyed a reputation in his/her Field Office as a good worker and stand-up agent who was not afraid to express his/her opinions. ROMEO PAPA 24 stated he/she has known SIERRA 35 for more than 30 years and rated SIERRA 35's reliability as absolute.

SIERRA 35 worked white collar crime matters, and he/she also worked in his/her Field Office's Applicant Unit, which gave SIERRA 35 direct access to the information detailed below.

"SIERRA 35 stated mandatory Physical Fitness standards are being relaxed at the FBI. Field Office Applicant Coordinators, according to SIERRA 35, are giving candidates multiple attempts to pass the Physical Fitness Test (PFT) in the Field before the candidates are approved to report for New Agents Training at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia. SIERRA 35 said that in more recent years, he/she has had a negative opinion of many candidates who apply to become FBI Special Agents because they show up completely out of shape despite knowing the Physical Fitness standards in advance. SIERRA 35 said many are entitled and need to be spoon-fed and have their hands held."²⁸

²⁷ See Section II: Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources, for reporting by SIERRA 55, page 52.

²⁸ See Section II: Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources, for reporting by SIERRA 35, pages 70-71.

NOTE: During an interview posted online on April 6, 2023, Former U.S. Attorney General William P. Barr who served as U.S. Attorney General from 1991 to 1993 and again from 2019 to 2020 said, ***“...they dumbed down some of the requirements early on. Nowadays, the physical requirements have been decreased by two-thirds what they used to be. That has changed the culture in the FBI.”***²⁹

In a September 2023 newsletter posted online entitled “Alumni E-Brief”, the FBI reported that in a recent Basic Field Training Course (BFTC) at the FBI Academy that graduated 182 New Agent Trainees (NATs), ***“The top physical fitness performer scored 34 out of 40 possible points on the Physical Fitness Test which included timed sit-ups, a 300m sprint, pushups, and a 1.5 mile run. Another seven trainees scored more than 30 points on the PFT.”***³⁰

²⁹ Vivek Ramaswamy, “Trump’s Attorney General Bill Barr | The Vivek Show,” April 6, 2023, public policy video, 1:11:40, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0MTjHRW5WtU>.

³⁰ Critical observers will note the FBI’s modus operandi for publicly releasing information on the physical performance of its NATs is to showcase anomalous, individual performances rather than disclose the average physical performance scores of its NATs over a period of years to more accurately reflect the relative improvement or decline of the physical fitness level of the FBI Special Agent workforce. See “Alumni E-Brief,” FBI, accessed September 19, 2023, <https://www.fbi.gov/how-we-can-help-you/outreach/alumni-e-brief/alumni-e-brief-september-2023>.

v. Poor Writing Skills and Remedial English Classes

ROMEO PAPA 19 ON SIERRA 67

SIERRA 67 served for more than 20 years as an FBI Special Agent and Supervisory Special Agent (SSA). SIERRA 67's access to the information provided below is direct, and his/her reporting is considered, without question, reliable.

"SIERRA 67 said that in approximately 2018, a disabled Veteran in his/her late 40s graduated from the FBI Academy as a Special Agent and was assigned to an FBI Field Office near the city where the Veteran already resided. SIERRA 67 said it became clear to this New Agent's squad members and the Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) that the New Agent was not capable of writing basic reports (FD-302s, ECs, etc.) or making sound decisions. Squad members, according to SIERRA 67, liked this New Agent as a person, but they could not rely on him/her to complete the normal amount of work. According to SIERRA 67, the New Agent was used as a 'helper.' The New Agent would be the second agent present during an interview. The agent could make photocopies and put binders together. The New Agent could sit on a surveillance. SIERRA 67 said the training agent assigned to this New Agent did not want to provide the New Agent any constructive criticism regarding his/her inability to interview or write reports because the training agent did not want to 'make waves' or 'hurt (the New Agent's) feelings.' SIERRA 67 said that when these issues were brought to the SSA's attention, the issues were ignored and overlooked...SIERRA 67 said FBI Management is hesitant to act on incompetence in cases like this because Equal Employment Opportunity complaints (EEOs) are quite prevalent. Agents, SSAs, Assistant Special Agents In Charge, Special Agents In Charge, or any FBI employees do not want EEOs because that can stop their ability to move up the ladder. Consequently, many SSAs avoid conflict and are more concerned with everyone liking them. SIERRA 67 further stated incompetent or problem agents are not held responsible for their lack of work, and this affects morale negatively. This, according to SIERRA 67, has been going on in the FBI for many years."³¹

³¹ See Section II: Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources, for reporting by SIERRA 67, pages 81-82.

ROMEO PAPA 73 ON SIERRA 11

SIERRA 11 is a 10-plus year veteran of the FBI with experience as (1) an aggressive criminal agent working violent crime and money laundering matters, and (2) as a training agent, which at the time provided SIERRA 11 with direct access to the information detailed below.

SIERRA 11 works at the highest level and has received awards for work performance and case complexity. SIERRA 11 also generated a high number of statistics and assets seized/claimed. SIERRA 11 has a military background and is currently an FBI Supervisory Special Agent.

“Citing a specific incident, SIERRA 11 said he/she was correcting the report writing of a new agent and in the process provided feedback to the new agent on the new agent’s writing skills. SIERRA 11 advised the new agent that his/her writing skills needed improvement and that the new agent needed to pay attention to detail. The new agent, according to SIERRA 11, went to the supervisor and complained about SIERRA 11 being too difficult and expecting too much.”³²

ROMEO PAPA 56 ON SIERRA 37

SIERRA 37 is a 20-plus year veteran of the FBI, with service as a Special Agent, Supervisory Special Agent (SSA), and staff instructor at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia.

ROMEO PAPA 56 has verified SIERRA 37’s reliability, trustworthiness, and competence; and SIERRA 37’s level of access was direct when engaged in teaching New Agent Trainees (NATs). SIERRA 37 has made comments to ROMEO PAPA 56 regarding the following subject matter during various conversations over a period of years.

“SIERRA 37 reported that a number of NATs (New Agent Trainees) have significant difficulty writing in a coherent manner. SIERRA 37 further stated NATs often fail to utilize proper capitalization, punctuation, and sentence structure, and they generally have a difficult time reducing to writing information gathered during NAT training exercises. SIERRA 37 said the quality of NATs in terms of suitability for employment as an FBI Special Agent is significantly lower than the quality of NATs of years past.”³³

³² See Section II: Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources, for reporting by SIERRA 11, page 85.

³³ See Section II: Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources, for reporting by SIERRA 37, page 86.

ROMEO PAPA 24 ON SIERRA 79

SIERRA 79's service as an FBI Special Agent stretched across four decades. SIERRA 79 is also highly respected as a criminal investigator. SIERRA 79's access to the information provided is direct, and his/her reporting is considered, without question, reliable.

"SIERRA 79 recalled the story of a minority female FBI Special Agent who previously served in the U.S. Armed Forces. The agent's race and branch of the military in which the agent served were not disclosed here to protect the agent's identity. SIERRA 79 said the agent arrived in his/her first FBI Field Office straight out of the FBI Academy and 'could not compose a simple FD-302.' The FD-302 is an FBI Interview Report Form. According to SIERRA 79, the agent's writing skills were so poor, the agent was sent to a local college to take remedial English classes. SIERRA 79 said the agent never made a case or wrote an affidavit and had to be pulled along to support investigations conducted by the agent's squad. SIERRA 79 further stated he/she doesn't believe the agent ever testified because the agent could not be trusted in court. SIERRA 79 said that during the agent's probationary period, the agent's supervisor went up the chain of command to the supervisor's Assistant Special Agent In Charge (ASAC) to request that the agent be terminated from employment as a Special Agent. The ASAC, who also happened to be the same race as the agent, advised the supervisor that – paraphrasing here - we need minority female agents. In response, the supervisor told the ASAC – again, paraphrasing here - we need 'qualified' minority female agents. SIERRA 79 believed other agents in the office of all ethnic backgrounds took notice of the agent's glaring, below average performance. Their general reaction, according to SIERRA 79, ranged from embarrassment, head shakes, stunned silence, to begrudging acknowledgement that they and the FBI were stuck with the agent."³⁴

³⁴ See Section II: Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources, for reporting by SIERRA 79, pages 88-89.

vi. New Agent Trainees, Mental Health and Drama at the FBI Academy

ROMEO PAPA 56 ON SIERRA 48

SIERRA 48 is a retired FBI veteran who served for more than 20 years as an FBI Special Agent, Supervisory Special Agent (SSA), and staff instructor at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia.

SIERRA 48's reliability, trustworthiness, and competence have been verified by other FBI Agents, and SIERRA 48's level of access was direct when engaged in teaching New Agent Trainees (NATs) at the FBI Academy.

"SIERRA 48, along with the NAT (New Agent Trainee) Counselor, interviewed the NAT who was visibly upset and crying. When queried by SIERRA 48, the NAT advised that he/she was having boyfriend/girlfriend ('significant other') issues. SIERRA 48 further queried the NAT about the issue and learned that the NAT was experiencing a sense of loss due to the separation from the NAT's significant other. SIERRA 48 was not able to elicit any information about what caused the NAT to suffer the emotional reaction the NAT experienced. The NAT calmed down during the discussion, but during the discussion, NAT disclosed that he/she was suffering from clinical depression and was under the care of a medical professional. After the interview/discussion with the NAT was complete, SIERRA 48 questioned the NAT's Counselor and expressed a degree of alarm about the NAT's suitability to engage in new agent training due to the disclosed clinical depression diagnosis. The Counselor advised that the issue was known to the Bureau and the NAT in question had been 'cleared' to engage in new agent training by the FBI psychologist/psychiatrist. SIERRA 48 was astounded that the NAT would be allowed to engage in new agent training, especially with access to firearms."³⁵

³⁵ See Section II: Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources, for reporting by SIERRA 48, pages 74-75.

ROMEO PAPA 56 ON SIERRA 48

SIERRA 48 is a retired FBI veteran who served for more than 20 years as an FBI Special Agent, Supervisory Special Agent (SSA), and staff instructor at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia.

SIERRA 48's reliability, trustworthiness, and competence have been verified by other FBI Agents, and SIERRA 48's level of access was direct when engaged in teaching New Agent Trainees (NATs) at the FBI Academy.

“SIERRA 48 was advised by a fellow staff instructor (Fellow Supervisory Special Agent (SSA)) at the FBI Academy that the Fellow SSA witnessed a NAT (New Agent Trainee) whose hands were cut on the back of the palms. The Fellow SSA, in conversation with SIERRA 48, advised that the Fellow SSA queried the NAT as to the cause of the injuries. The NAT said the injuries were the result of physical training in the FBI Academy Gymnasium. Shortly after that discussion, the Fellow SSA said he/she again witnessed the same NAT with additional injuries to the back of the NAT's hands. The injuries required bandaging. The Fellow SSA again asked the NAT about the cause of the injuries. The NAT advised the Fellow SSA that the NAT was physically punching the wall of the FBI Academy Gymnasium. Fellow SSA asked the NAT why the NAT engaged in that kind of behavior. The NAT replied, ‘Because I am filled with self-hate and rage.’”³⁶

³⁶ See Section II: Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources, for reporting by SIERRA 48, page 75.

ROMEO PAPA 21 ON SIERRA 32

SIERRA 32 is a veteran of the FBI who served for more than 20 years in major FBI Field Offices throughout the country. SIERRA 32 worked in a number of investigative and administrative areas, including work as an Undercover Agent. SIERRA 32 received numerous commendations for his/her dedicated FBI service from local, state, and federal law enforcement organizations.

SIERRA 32 also served in a supervisory role at the New Agents Training Unit (NATU), FBI Academy, Quantico, Virginia. During this time, SIERRA 32 had direct access to behavioral, performance-related, and other pertinent information regarding New Agent Trainees (NATs) and is in a unique position to provide both a historical and contemporary perspective on recruitment at the FBI.

"In 2023, SIERRA 32 visited the FBI Academy. SIERRA 32 spoke with a NAT (New Agent Trainee) who stuttered and appeared to have Tourette Syndrome or other tic disorder that hindered the NAT's ability to communicate. SIERRA 32 wondered how this NAT would function in a high-threat, hostile environment."³⁷

ROMEO PAPA 19 ON SIERRA 67

SIERRA 67 served for more than 20 years as an FBI Special Agent and Supervisory Special Agent (SSA). SIERRA 67's access to the information provided below is direct, and his/her reporting is considered, without question, reliable.

"SIERRA 67 said New Agent Trainees (NATs) at the FBI Academy ranged in age from early 20s to 50s. According to SIERRA 67, the longstanding requirement of three (3) years minimum (pre-FBI) work experience was decreased to two (2) years or less depending on the person, and working on a Master's Degree could count as work experience. SIERRA 67 said there were NATs who never had any professional work experience but had received a Bachelor's Degree and were working on a Master's Degree. Regarding NATs younger than 25 years old, SIERRA 67 said the lack of maturity due to limited work and life experiences contributed to drama during New Agent training."³⁸

³⁷ See Section II: Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources, for reporting by SIERRA 32, page 78.

³⁸ See Section II: Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources, for reporting by SIERRA 67, page 82.

ROMEO PAPA 73 ON SIERRA 59

SIERRA 59 served as an FBI Special Agent for more than 20 years and enjoyed an exceptional reputation among his/her peers as a hard-working, detailed oriented and accomplished criminal investigator.

“SIERRA 59 stated that based on information received from a colleague employed by the FBI with first-hand knowledge, the probationary period for New Agents is two (2) years, including their training time at the FBI Academy. According to SIERRA 59, the probationary period is only one (1) year for New Agents coming in from the military, which also includes their training time at the FBI Academy. SIERRA 59 said the probationary period should be at least two (2) years in the Field for all New Agents because it takes at least that long to determine the agent’s true character and integrity.”³⁹

³⁹ See Section II: Reporting Persons, Sources & Sub-Sources, for reporting by SIERRA 59, page 101.

G. THE FBI DIRECTOR’S CREDIBILITY

1. DIRECT CONTRADICTION TO REPORTS FROM THE FIELD

- a. Despite these findings from highly credible and reliable Sources and Sub-sources with direct access and first-hand knowledge, FBI Director Christopher Wray reportedly continues to assert within FBI circles that FBI recruitment for Special Agents is “going extremely well.”

2. SOCIETY OF FORMER SPECIAL AGENTS OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

- a. On June 9, 2023, FBI Director Wray and other top FBI officials met the Board of Directors of the Society of Former Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.⁴⁰ Included in the meeting were Society President Dennis Lormel, the Society Secretary, Treasurer, Regional Vice Presidents and others including Society Executive Director Nancy Savage.⁴¹
- b. FBI Director Wray was reported to have said during the meeting that – quoting the Society’s report to its members - “Agent hiring is going extremely well in terms of number of applications, which allows us to focus on hiring strategic skillsets without compromising quality.”⁴²

⁴⁰ The Society is a private 501(c)(7) nonprofit organization with approximately 8,500 members organized in eight geographic regions and 120 chapters. See “History,” Society of Former Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, accessed August 26, 2023, <https://socxfbi.org/SFSA/SFSA/About-Us/History.aspx?hkey=89d7e1d8-e366-4d16-86ce-9ccb3b8a37a>.

⁴¹ The Society website states the Society “is not a part of the Federal Bureau of Investigation or acting on behalf of the FBI”, but many current and former Society members believe the Society, in fact, serves as a de facto propaganda arm of the FBI Director’s Office.

Infatuated with access to the FBI Director, Society leadership consistently fails to challenge the Director in any meaningful way on complex, controversial issues that matter to active-duty and retired agents.

As a result, many members of the Society throughout the country have let their memberships expire and have withdrawn their support for the Society. They feel abandoned and betrayed by Society leadership, citing as an example Society President Lormel who has used his position to issue politically left-leaning commentary on “False Narratives” to the Society National Board, Chapter Chairs, and membership without consultation, guidance or approval from dues paying members of the Society who vehemently disagree with his personal opinions.

⁴² Nancy Savage, “Board Meeting with FBI Executives,” *the Grapevine*, May/June, 2023, 7.

H. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMMEDIATE CONGRESSIONAL ACTION

1. The Alliance of retired and active-duty FBI Special Agents and Analysts believes selecting sub-par candidates to serve as Special Agents of the FBI – the singularly most important federal law enforcement and domestic intelligence agency of the United States - poses an unacceptable risk to America’s National Security and the safety of all Americans.
2. Failure to recruit and hire only the highest quality candidates to become FBI Special Agents not only risks the FBI’s inherent ability to defeat criminal, terrorist and foreign intelligence threats but also jeopardizes the critical support from law enforcement partners and citizenry essential for the FBI to succeed.
3. As reported by the Sources and Sub-sources in this Report, the FBI’s current hiring practices are significantly impacting the FBI’s ability to fulfill its mission, with potentially catastrophic consequences.
4. To reverse this decline, the authors of this Report make the following recommendations:
 - a. ORDER A COMPREHENSIVE AUDIT
 - i. The Alliance strongly recommends the House Committee on the Judiciary, the Select Subcommittee on the Weaponization of the Federal Government, and the House Committee on Oversight and Accountability work in unison to order without delay a comprehensive 90-day audit of the FBI’s recruitment and selection process.
 - ii. Use the detailed, anecdotal reporting contained herein as a guide to task one or both of the following agencies to determine the full scope and impact of the FBI’s most egregious failures and provide recommendations for corrective administrative measures and legislative action:
 1. U.S. Government Accountability Office⁴³
 2. Congressional Research Service⁴⁴
 - iii. Collect from the FBI all relevant FBI Special Agent Recruitment and Selection statistics for the last 20 years, including month-to-month totals of FBI Special Agent applications received; evaluation and scoring averages for all FBI Special Agent applicants throughout all phases of assessment and testing based on all

⁴³ “What GAO Does,” U.S. Government Accountability Office, accessed August 31, 2023, <https://www.gao.gov/about/what-gao-does>.

⁴⁴ “About Site & FAQs,” Congressional Research Service, accessed August 31, 2023, <https://crsreports.congress.gov/Home/About>.

identifiable applicant categories; total number annually, average age and average years of full-time work experience of applicants selected to enter the FBI Academy for New Agent Training; annual failure rates at the FBI Academy based on applicant categories; graduation rates; annual number and percentage of New FBI Special Agents who failed to complete their probationary periods; termination and retention rates for FBI Special Agents at five-year intervals; and any other statistically relevant data needed to identify trends in the quality of applicants selected to become FBI Special Agents.

b. CHALLENGE THE FBI DIRECTOR

- i. The Alliance also recommends Congressional Committees responsible for oversight of the U.S. Department of Justice and the FBI conduct their own independent investigations and hold public hearings to determine whether the FBI Director is (1) willfully lying to conceal significant deficiencies in FBI Special Agent recruitment and selection that threaten the operational strength and future of the agency and/or (2) has been misinformed by career-minded FBI Executive Managers fearful of retribution for telling the Director the truth, as reported by Sources and Sub-sources cited in this Report.
- ii. The Alliance recommends the following FBI officials, including those with direct access to and first-hand knowledge of FBI Special Agent recruitment and selection matters, be called to testify before Congress:
 1. FBI Director
 2. FBI Headquarters Executive Managers
 3. FBI Headquarters Support Staff
 4. FBI Special Agent Applicant Coordinators in the Field
 5. FBI Special Agent Assessors in the Field
 6. Background Investigators assigned to FBI Special Agent Applicant Matters
 7. Retired FBI Special Agents and Support Staff who while employed by the FBI had direct knowledge of FBI Special Agent recruitment and selection matters.

c. STRENGTHEN THE OATH OF OFFICE FOR FBI SPECIAL AGENTS

- i. The Alliance also strongly urges members of Congress from both sides of the aisle to introduce legislation that would add new language to the Oath of Office administered to all new FBI Special Agents.⁴⁵
- ii. The new language, highlighted in red below, must be added to protect the American people against official action by rogue FBI Special Agents driven by their own uncontrolled political activism and bias to investigate citizens who disagree with their personal views:

"I (name) do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States as written against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation, purpose of evasion, or personal political agenda; and that I will well and faithfully and without undue influence, prejudice, or personal bias discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help me God."

- iii. The following language should also be considered to ensure the promise of full, affirmative compliance:

"I pledge to carry out my duties (as a Special Agent of the FBI) with integrity, impartiality, and respect for the rights and freedoms of all individuals, regardless of their political beliefs, race, religion, age, gender, nationality or social status."

- iv. As a critical part of this new legislation, all current FBI Special Agents – not just new FBI Special Agents entering the workforce - must also be required to make the same enhanced, legally binding promise.
- v. For the new Oath to carry genuine meaning beyond mere ceremonial formality, legislation must also set forth as real consequences of violating the Oath:
 1. Mandatory termination from FBI employment on the first offense
 2. Disqualification from receiving any taxpayer-funded federal pension
 3. Criminal penalties, including imprisonment.

⁴⁵ "5 USC PART III, Subpart B, CHAPTER 33, SUBCHAPTER II: OATH OF OFFICE," Office of the Law Revision Counsel, United States Code, accessed August 31, 2023, <https://uscode.house.gov/statviewer.htm?volume=80&page=424>.

I. CONCLUSION

1. The authors of this Report on FBI Special Agent Recruitment and Selection took an Oath to defend the Constitution and protect and serve the federal government's first and only clients – the American people. The Oath they took has no expiration date, and the authors are as strongly committed to keeping that promise today as they were the very first day they swore an allegiance to the United States of America as Special Agents and Analysts of the FBI.
2. For the FBI to regain the trust of a Nation, there must be (a) full transparency on widely reported deficiencies in FBI Special Agent recruitment and selection, (b) official acknowledgement by the FBI Director of historic organizational failures at the FBI, and (c) a unified, bi-partisan approach to detailing recommendations and implementing practical solutions that will either force a desperately needed course correction for the FBI or pave the way for the creation of a new agency to replace it.

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II. REPORTING PERSONS, SOURCES & SUB-SOURCES

A. FBI SPECIAL AGENT APPLICANT COORDINATORS & ASSESSORS

SOURCE: SIERRA 87

LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS

RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable | Unknown

ACCESS LEVEL: Direct | Indirect | Unknown

REPORTING HISTORY: Initial | # of Years (Decades)

COOPERATION TYPE: Knowing | Unknowing | Official

CORROBORATION LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document

On July 29, 2023, the Reporting Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 14), an expert consultant on law enforcement matters with more than 20 years in the FBI as a Special Agent and Supervisory Special Agent, provided the following information obtained first-hand from a human source (Codename SIERRA 87):

SOURCE DESCRIPTION

SIERRA 87 served for more than 20 years in the FBI as a Special Agent and Recruitment Coordinator. ROMEO PAPA 14 has known SIERRA 87 for his/her entire career. SIERRA 87 was awarded multiple accolades and is known for his/her exemplary work ethic, attitude, and achievements. In spite of the politicization of the FBI, SIERRA 87 continues to have a deep love for the USA and FBI.

FEARFUL OF RETALIATION

SIERRA 87 is fearful of being retaliated against even though SIERRA 87 is retired. SIERRA 87 wants to remain anonymous.

FBI LEADERSHIP ISSUES

According to SIERRA 87, one issue that made working with applicants difficult was the “extreme turnover” at the Assistant Director (AD) position and lower-level positions at the Human Resources Division (HRD). It seemed every change of leadership led to tweaks in the process and how the field was to respond. SIERRA 87 said changes would occur monthly, and SIERRA 87 stated HRD leadership was reactionary and wasn’t interested in hearing from the field. Per SIERRA 87, AD HRD “drives the ship but the ship is rudderless.”

NO WORK OR FBI EXPERIENCE

SIERRA 87 said former HRD AD David Schlendorf hired a number of Ivy University graduates fresh out of school and placed them in high-level positions to do “strategic planning.” SIERRA 87 said these people had no work experience, no knowledge of the FBI, and yet were responsible for establishing policy, procedures, and goals with counterproductive results.

DEROGATORY INSPECTION FINDINGS

SIERRA 87 believed there was an inspection of the FBIHQ Security section responsible for backgrounds in 2022. Several findings were made against the section, as well as against Section Chief Earl Camp and Unit Chief Rod Vargas. SIERRA 87 believed the primary problem was the AD was a “metrics guy” but was following the wrong metrics and telling (FBI Director Christopher) Wray they were successful when they were not.

For example, the AD, according to SIERRA 87, would proclaim the pass rate for Phase II had remained the same at 50% and the FBI was still hiring the “best and the brightest.” But this wasn’t true.

LOWER STANDARDS

SIERRA 87 stated FBIHQ had significantly lowered the standards to apply, so the quality of the applicants entering the process was noticeably lower. Field Recruiters and Applicant Coordinators believe the Phase II is appreciably easier than previously. The written portion of Phase I has been changed and no longer requires complex thought. It now requires reading and a regurgitation of information via a list.

EASIER INTERVIEW PROCESS

According to SIERRA 87, the interview portion is also considerably easier because applicants are told how to prepare and what to study. Previously, applicants took the Phase II interview knowing only the format (i.e., panel interview). The interview questions and core competencies were confidential. Now, the FBI website lists the core competencies for Phase II. During applicant Meet and Greets, and prior to Phase II, applicants are again told the core competencies covered on the interview and how to prepare. Applicants are coached to respond to questions using the Situation, Action, Results (SAR) format and prepare answers to the core competencies.

PHASE II PASS RATE

SIERRA 87 stated the initial pass rate for Phase II may be 50%, but FBIHQ doesn't disclose the pass rate for those who failed Phase II and retook the test.

According to SIERRA 87, if an applicant failed the Phase II and retakes it a year later, SIERRA 87 believed that in his/her professional opinion, the applicant should be failed again unless the applicant obtained substantial quality work experience in that year. Previously, if applicants failed Phase II, they recognized the need to obtain additional quality work experience to be competitive. Those who successfully retook Phase II were typically those who worked an additional 5-plus years to gain valuable work experience.

SIERRA 87 believed the pass rate for applicants now taking the Phase II a second time is close to 100%. Not only have they been coached as to how to respond (i.e., SARs) and the core competencies, they now know the questions that will be asked. Now, candidates know the system and come back and pass a year later. According to SIERRA 87, they did not pass due to the applicant gaining substantial and impressive work experience during that year; they simply knew the answers.

PHASE II SCORING

SIERRA 87 said scoring for Phase II has become easier. Previously, an applicant who failed to address the core competency or who had no relevant experience in that competency would be given a score of 0. Now, the lowest score that can be given is a 1. In addition, assessors are now told to combine answers to address other competencies. For example, if the question dealt with organization and planning, but the applicant touched on leadership, the assessor is to go back and add that to the leadership score.

ASSESSOR SELECTION AND TRAINING

Previously, once an agent was certified as an assessor, the agent remained an assessor unless removed for bad conduct, according to SIERRA 87. In about 2019, FBIHQ removed ALL assessors and, regardless of the number of years of experience serving as an assessor, all assessors had to reapply.

The field office and FBIHQ decided whom to let back into the program. This was seen as an attempt to remove senior assessors and replace them with newer, "easier" and more diverse assessors.

Previously, assessors were required to attend an in-person, one-week training session that included in-depth role-playing and hands-on training to include listening to audio recordings of Phase II interviews to calibrate ratings and practice collaboration and consensus on ratings.

This was replaced by two days of in-person training and some virtual training. Experienced assessors found that many new assessors scored much higher, gave out “perfect” scores for mediocre answers, did not score objectively, and awarded high scores based on if they liked the candidate.

PERSONNEL SECURITY SPECIALISTS

Referring to the inspection of the Security Division in 2022, SIERRA 87 advised one result of the inspection was moving employees, primarily Personnel Security Specialists (PSS) involved in background investigations, from FBIHQ to Huntsville, Alabama. SIERRA 87 said it seemed better employees found new positions at FBIHQ, and less-qualified, poorer performing employees were transferred to Huntsville. This led to continued bad performance, as these transferred employees were responsible for training newly hired PSSs.

LOWER QUALITY CANDIDATES

SIERRA 87 believes that in general, the quality of FBI applicants is considerably lower and highly qualified candidates are going elsewhere. SIERRA 87 said there are a number of reasons the FBI is getting noticeably lower quality candidates:

DRUG POLICY, PHYSICAL FITNESS, FINANCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, MENTAL ILLNESS

SIERRA 87 said the drug policy has been liberalized to include applicants who had a lifestyle of using drugs. The physical fitness test is easier, and candidates are required to pass it only once. Failure to adhere to financial responsibilities is no longer a disqualifier. A candidate who was arrested and fought with police officers was not disqualified. Candidates with Driving Under the Influence (DUI) convictions are not disqualified. People with a documented mental illness are not necessarily disqualified.

LACK OF CANDOR

Lack of candor is no longer a disqualifier. SIERRA 87 said there have been candidates he/she has documented as lying during different stages of the process, to include the Meet and Greet, but FBIHQ refused to disqualify them. FBIHQ forced the field to continue the application process.

QUALITY OF COLLEGE AND GPA

SIERRA 87 said the quality of the college the applicant graduated from is no longer considered. A person with a degree from an on-line university is weighted the same as an applicant who graduated from a U.S. Military Academy or top-tier academic college. A 3.0 GPA is required to be an FBI Honors Intern, but there is no GPA requirement to become a Special Agent. SIERRA 87 believes some candidates are being processed who have barely maintained a “D” average.

In 2021 and/or 2022, FBIHQ invited presidents and administrators from Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCUs) to an all-expense-paid event in Huntsville to discuss the recruitment and hiring of HBCU students. For internships and hiring, HBCU students are moved to the front of the line, even in front of Black applicants who attended a military academy or top-tier academic college.

MILITARY EXPERIENCE

According to SIERRA 87, applicants with military experience were given a preference in scheduling a Meet and Greet; but now, all former military personnel MUST proceed to Phase II regardless of rank, assignment, or quality of work experience. SIERRA 87 said one individual's military responsibility was to change vehicle tires in Iraq. That person was moved ahead of other qualified candidates to attend Phase II.

DIVERSITY EVENTS

SIERRA 87 said recruiters are rated on their Performance Appraisals for hosting Diversity Applicant Recruitment (DAR) events. Invitations are only given to those in minority groups based on race, sexual orientation, etc. According to SIERRA 87, straight white males may not attend. If a recruiter chose NOT to attend a Pride Parade or fly the Pride flag, SIERRA 87 said the recruiter would most likely be removed immediately as the performance evaluation of the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) includes this participation.

TRANSGENDER NAT

SIERRA 87 stated he/she heard of a transgender New Agent Trainee (NAT) at FBIHQ who was transitioning or had transitioned from female to male. The NAT, according to SIERRA 87, insisted on being treated and referred to as a male until the NAT failed the fitness exam for males. The NAT then decided he/she should be graded using the fitness exam for females.

No additional information was provided.

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SOURCE: SIERRA 72

LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS

RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable | Unknown

ACCESS LEVEL: Direct | Indirect | Unknown

REPORTING HISTORY: Initial | # of Years (15)

COOPERATION TYPE: Knowing | Unknowning | Official

CORROBORATION LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document

On August 4, 2023, the Reporting Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 45), a retired FBI Special Agent whose 20-plus years of service included leadership as a Supervisory Special Agent and who now works as a Senior Corporate Security Executive, provided the following information obtained first-hand from a human source (Codename SIERRA 72):

SOURCE DESCRIPTION

SIERRA 72 is a 15-plus year veteran of the Federal Bureau of Investigation who is leading a squad of FBI personnel as a Supervisory Special Agent (SSA). SIERRA 72 is a diligent, hard-working, and friendly individual who strives to serve and uphold the values of the United States. SIERRA 72 traveled overseas on multiple occasions to train allies in various law enforcement techniques.

During casual conversation, SIERRA 72 expressed noticeable frustration about today's FBI. The emotional and mental toll could be seen on SIERRA 72's face and heard in his/her voice.

FEARFUL OF RETALIATION

SIERRA 72 counts the time when he/she is eligible to retire. SIERRA 72 loves the FBI, but it is no longer the FBI he/she joined years ago. SIERRA 72 is doing what he/she can but is fearful of retaliation and cannot afford to lose his/her job since he/she is the family's primary breadwinner.

DECLINE IN QUALITY

SIERRA 72 serves as one of the field office's Agent Applicant Assessors in evaluating, interviewing, testing, and conducting physical fitness tests (PFTs) for individuals seeking to

become FBI Special Agents. SIERRA 72 has been in this collateral duty assignment for many years. He/she enjoys the opportunity to meet and vet people who will be the next generation of FBI Special Agents.

During the past six years, SIERRA 72 said there had been a noticeable drop in the quality of Agent candidates (referred to interchangeably as candidate or applicant). When he/she started as an assessor, candidates with questionable backgrounds impacting their integrity, drug use, or failing to pass PFT standards were quickly dismissed for consideration. Now, FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ) is dismissing negative reports provided by assessors when derogatory information is developed and ordering the continuation of candidates through the Agent application process.

In one instance, SIERRA 72 reported that he/she disqualified a candidate because the candidate's only work experience was working two years as a coffee shop barista and having a bachelor's degree in art history. SIERRA 72 did not recommend this candidate because he/she believes the candidate is not as competitive as other candidates and did not have at least one year of full-time professional work experience. FBIHQ ordered SIERRA 72 to continue this applicant to the next stage in the Agent process.

In another instance, SIERRA 72 disqualified another applicant because she was more than 50 pounds overweight using the FBI's body fat index and could not pass the PFT. FBIHQ again ordered SIERRA 72 to continue this candidate's application package. This particular candidate was an African American female who told SIERRA 72 that she "hates working out and was never active." SIERRA 72 told the applicant that maintaining a level of physical fitness is part of the job of being an Agent, and it is a good way to maintain a better quality of life.

DIVERSITY OVER QUALITY

SIERRA 72 does not care about the candidate's race, skin color, or sex, but he/she believes FBIHQ is more interested in diversity than getting qualified candidates. SIERRA 72 asked ROMEO PAPA 45 to search the FBI's recruiting website and social media, highlighting its effort to push diversity over the quality of the candidate. Most of the meetings SIERRA 72 attends with the FBI's Human Resources Department focus on hiring diverse candidates of different races and sexes than hiring candidates who will add value to supporting the FBI's mission.

SIERRA 72 believes in the FBI's mission, and SIERRA 72 said today's FBI is getting so political and woke that it is hurting the organization's ability to hire the best, most qualified candidates. It seems FBIHQ is more interested in hiring people of different colors, races, and sex than the best candidates who can serve as effective investigators.

SIERRA 72 participated in and spoke at several Bureau recruiting events. Based on his/her first-hand experiences as an assessor, SIERRA 72 believes the organization fails to recruit qualified applicants with the soft and hard skills to serve as FBI Agents. The FBI is not prioritizing attracting applicants with the training and work experiences needed to solve complex crimes and terrorism and address other technical threats.

SIERRA 72 is aware of instances where applicants with a mix of racial, gender, and age demographics seem to get priority in the Bureau's recruitment efforts over individuals who score at the top of the application assessment.

BREAD CRUMBS

The FBI used to be the prime federal law enforcement agency to apply to and usually attracted the best candidates seeking the (Criminal Investigation Series) 1811 federal investigator position. SIERRA 72 said the FBI lately is getting the "bread crumbs" from other agencies such as the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms (ATF), Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), and the United States Secret Service (USSS).

These agencies do not appear to have bent their requirements to be an 1811 like the FBI for the goal of diversity. SIERRA 72 is concerned about the FBI's future because it depends largely on the types of individuals it attracts and hires to fill 100s of different jobs within the agency.

No additional information was provided.

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SOURCE: SIERRA 51

LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS | (Not Disclosed)

RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable | Unknown

ACCESS LEVEL: Direct | Indirect | Unknown

REPORTING HISTORY: Initial | # of Years (10)

COOPERATION TYPE: Knowing | Unknowing | Official

CORROBORATION LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document

On July 29, 2023, the Reporting Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 14), an expert consultant on law enforcement matters with more than 20 years in the FBI as a Special Agent and Supervisory Special Agent, provided the following information obtained via a third party from a human source (Codename SIERRA 51):

SOURCE DESCRIPTION

SIERRA 51 is a 20-plus year veteran of the FBI who served as a Supervisory Special Agent, Phase II Assessor, and Applicant Coordinator. ROMEO PAPA 14 has known SIERRA 51 for ten years and knows SIERRA 51 to be honest and trustworthy. SIERRA 51 has a great, unblemished reputation at the FBI.

FEARFUL OF RETALIATION

SIERRA 51 chose to remain anonymous, as he/she is extremely fearful of being retaliated against by the FBI. SIERRA 51 stated he/she is close to retirement, didn't want to jeopardize his/her retirement, and certainly doesn't "trust (FBI Director Christopher) Wray."

FBI HEADQUARTERS INTERFERENCE

SIERRA 51 thought the general concept of the applicant process worked based on checks and balances put into place (Phase I, Meet and Greet, Personal Security Interview, Phase II, Polygraph, Background Investigation), but FBIHQ would interfere with the process and "ram" through certain applicants.

SIERRA 51 was frustrated by the constant changes in the application process implemented by FBIHQ. The changes include drug policy, fitness requirements, applicant preferences, etc. SIERRA 51 said FBIHQ seemed to react to “bad numbers” by immediately making policy and procedural changes without any long-term strategy. Because of this haphazard approach, it was impossible to ascertain if any of the changes had a positive or negative impact.

DRUG POLICY

The drug policy has changed significantly. SIERRA 51 believes the policy changed in 2021 regarding marijuana use. Previously, 25 uses of marijuana would disqualify a candidate. Now, unlimited use is permitted as long as the applicant had not used marijuana within one year of the application date. There was no consideration given if the drug use was experimental and temporary or if it was a “lifestyle.” Some candidates admitted they used drugs as a coping mechanism and were allowed to proceed in the process. The policy on the use of hard drugs was also made more lenient.

MENTAL HEALTH

The policy on mental health has also changed, according to SIERRA 51. Previously, treatment by a mental health professional for a mental illness would have disqualified an applicant. FBIHQ has moved applicants forward who were suffering from ADHD, anxiety, and other ailments that would affect their ability to be a Special Agent.

FINANCIAL ISSUES

SIERRA 51 stated financial irregularities are no longer cause for disqualification. Previously, a bankruptcy could be overlooked if there was sufficient justification (medical issues, ugly divorce, etc.). Now, applicants who have simply chosen not to pay their bills are allowed to continue in the process.

UNDISCLOSED STATISTICS

SIERRA 51 stated only FBIHQ has the numbers of how many people “hit the button” to apply, how many EOD (entered on duty), and the number for each phase in between. This is not shared with the field.

LOWER QUALITY

In general, SIERRA 51 believes the quality of applicants and agents is considerably and noticeably lower than previously.

No additional information was provided.

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SOURCE: SIERRA 28

LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS

RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable | Unknown

ACCESS LEVEL: Direct | Indirect | Unknown

REPORTING HISTORY: Initial | # of Years (12)

COOPERATION TYPE: Knowing | Unknowning | Official

CORROBORATION LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document

On July 26, 2023, the Reporting Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 39), a U.S. Marine Corps veteran and former local police officer who later served for more than 20 years as an FBI Special Agent and who now works in support of government law enforcement operations, provided the following information obtained first-hand from a human source (Codename SIERRA 28):

SOURCE DESCRIPTION

SIERRA 28 is a 15-plus year veteran of the FBI with approximately a decade of experience as a New Agent Assessor conducting Phase 2 interviews. ROMEO PAPA 39 has known SIERRA 28 for approximately 12 years, and the two have discussed the Phase 2 process based on a mutual interest in the program. ROMEO PAPA 39 has no doubt about SIERRA 28's authenticity, trustworthiness, or competence.

DECLINE IN APPLICANT QUALITY

During casual conversation, SIERRA 28 commented on the overall decline in the quality of applicants, specifically within the context of conducting Phase 2 interviews. SIERRA 28's decades long experience as a New Agent Assessor provides him/her with a unique and credible perspective and the requisite expertise to recognize a trend.

RATING APPLICANTS

SIERRA 28 did not furnish specific examples but stated that it is rare for more recent applicants to receive 6's or 7's on the rating scale.

For background, the scale on the seven dimensions ranges from 1 for low all the way to 7 for high.

Applicants are rated on the following 7 dimensions:

- Organizing, Planning and Prioritizing
- Relating Effectively with Others
- Demonstrating Honesty and Integrity
- Demonstrating Motivation and Initiative
- Adapting to Changing Situations
- Evaluating Information and Making Judgements/Decisions
- Ability to Communicate Orally

SIERRA 28 stated that it was not uncommon during his/her first few years as a New Agent Assessor (approximately a decade ago) to rate applicants with 6's and 7's.

SIERRA 28 did not offer speculation regarding possible causes for the measurable decline of the applicants but agreed that the decision to lower the (pre-FBI) work requirement from three years to two was to increase the pool of candidates.

Although SIERRA 28 did not express dissatisfaction with the FBI, he/she is planning to retire as soon as he/she becomes eligible.

No additional information was provided.

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SOURCE: SIERRA 64

LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS

RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable | Unknown

ACCESS LEVEL: Direct | Indirect | Unknown

REPORTING HISTORY: Initial | # of Years (15)

COOPERATION TYPE: Knowing | Unknowning | Official

CORROBORATION LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document

On July 18, 2023, the Reporting Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 39), a U.S. Marine Corps veteran and local police officer who later served for more than 20 years as an FBI Special Agent and who now works in support of government law enforcement operations, provided the following information obtained first-hand, including during casual conversations, from a human source (Codename SIERRA 64):

SOURCE DESCRIPTION

SIERRA 64 is a 15-plus year veteran of the FBI with previous experience as a Supervisory Special Agent and more recently as an Applicant Coordinator with direct access to the information provided.

ROMEO PAPA 39 has known SIERRA 64 for approximately 15 years. The two share similar backgrounds and have been work colleagues and friends. ROMEO PAPA 39 has no doubt about SIERRA 64's authenticity, trustworthiness, or competence.

POOR PHYSICAL FITNESS

During casual conversation, SIERRA 64 lamented the overall lack of physical fitness among the applicant pool. SIERRA 64 did not cite specific data, but he/she witnessed a high percentage of failures during his/her time as Applicant Coordinator on the entry standards for the FBI's Physical Fitness Test (PFT).

SIERRA 64 has seen on more than one occasion, an applicant receive a score of negative 2, the lowest possible score. Other times, applicants have simply quit in the middle of the 1.5-mile run.

SIERRA 64 stated that applicants are ineligible to advance to Phase 2 in the hiring process until they achieve a minimum score of 9 points on the PFT. SIERRA 64 stated the minimum score to pass the PFT is 12. SIERRA 64 did not specify the reason a below minimum score is acceptable to advance in the process or if it was lowered at some point.

FIREARMS STANDARDS

SIERRA 64 was not aware of the watering down or lack of enforcement of the firearms standards. SIERRA 64 said the PFI (Principal Firearms Instructor) in his/her Division is extremely professional and would sooner resign his position than abide by an order to ignore the standards. Furthermore, SIERRA 64 stated that it would be difficult to disregard current standards for qualification due to the reporting/retention requirements of the FIRST system. SIERRA 64's information was limited to the standards at his/her field office and did not comment on the level of scrutiny regarding firearms standards at the FBI Academy.

APPLICANT DISQUALIFICATION

SIERRA 64 stated that, in his/her role as Applicant Coordinator, he/she regularly discontinued applicants during meet and greets or upon determining other disqualifying information as part of the background investigation. SIERRA 64 denied that at any time was his/her decision to disqualify a candidate overruled by FBIHQ.

SIERRA 64 acknowledged the decision to lower the (pre-FBI) work requirement from three years to two years was to increase the size of the applicant pool. Despite this decision, the source maintains the FBI is still attracting quality candidates.

HIRING STANDARDS ELSEWHERE

SIERRA 64 was not aware of the possible lowering of hiring standards at other federal agencies such as the Secret Service, DEA, ATF, or USMS.

No additional information was provided.

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SOURCE: SIERRA 55

LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS

RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable | Unknown

ACCESS LEVEL: Direct | Indirect | Unknown

REPORTING HISTORY: Initial | # of Years (More Than 5)

COOPERATION TYPE: Knowing | Unknowning | Official

CORROBORATION LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document

On August 29, 2023, the Reporting Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 89), who spent more than 20 years working criminal and counterintelligence matters as an FBI Special Agent and who believes it was important to serve the American public as a member of a service he/she still cares deeply for, provided the following information obtained first-hand from a human source (Codename SIERRA 55):

SOURCE DESCRIPTION

SIERRA 55 has served as an FBI Special Agent for approximately a decade, with experience working criminal and intelligence matters. ROMEO PAPA 89 has worked directly with SIERRA 55, and ROMEO PAPA 89 has known SIERRA 55 for a total of more than five years. ROMEO PAPA 89 described SIERRA 55 as reliable and squared away, and SIERRA 55's access to the information detailed below is direct based on SIERRA 55's role as an FBI Special Agent Recruiter.

HIRING NUMBERS ARE DOWN

SIERRA 55 said FBI hiring numbers are down. Recruiters, according to SIERRA 55, were just recently tasked by an FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ) Unit Chief to try to get the numbers up.

SIERRA 55 said a target is to get approximately 180 individuals ready to send to the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia for New Agents Training, and they are at around 150. Remarks have been made, SIERRA 55 said, to try to find ways to get people ready, whatever it might take.

DIVERSITY NUMBERS

SIERRA 55 said there seems to be a lot of interest in diversity numbers, and it was unclear from SIERRA 55's reporting who specifically at the Field Office level and/or at FBIHQ was inquiring about those numbers.

SIERRA 55 said he/she doesn't see an applicant until FBIHQ processes them and after their Phase I interview.

LOWER PHYSICAL FITNESS REQUIREMENTS

SIERRA 55 said physical fitness requirements have changed for applicants. Currently, an FBI Special Agent applicant can score as low as a nine (9) prior to going to the FBI Academy where the minimum passing score is twelve (12).

SIERRA 55 said FBI Special Agent applicants can score a zero (0) in a physical fitness event.

No additional information was provided.

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B. DIVERSITY, EQUITY AND INCLUSION (DEI) & THE WOKE IDEOLOGY

SOURCE: SIERRA 41

LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS

RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable | Unknown

ACCESS LEVEL: Direct | Indirect | Unknown

REPORTING HISTORY: Initial | # of Years (More Than 20 Years)

COOPERATION TYPE: Knowing | Unknowing | Official

CORROBORATION LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document

On July 18, 2023, August 10, 2023, and August 11, 2023, the Reporting Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 62), a 20-plus year veteran of the FBI who investigated white collar crime, organized crime, and terrorism matters and who also served as a Supervisory Special Agent, provided the following information obtained first-hand from a human source (Codename SIERRA 41):

SOURCE DESCRIPTION

SIERRA 41 is a minority and served for more than 20 years as an FBI Special Agent. He/she spent over 12 years working in the FBI applicant recruitment process. ROMEO PAPA 62 has known SIERRA 41 for SIERRA 41's entire career in the FBI, and ROMEO PAPA 62 characterizes SIERRA 41 as highly consistent, reliable, and credible.

FEEDBACK DISMISSED

While venting to ROMEO PAPA 62, SIERRA 41 stated FBI support employees at FBI Headquarters overrule recommendations made by field agents to not hire applicants. According to SIERRA 41, these support employees would not even entertain agents' suggestions or input regarding applicants.

SIERRA 41 added he/she provided valuable input to improve the FBI Special Agent selection process, but the support employees at FBI Headquarters would not listen.

DIVERSITY OVER QUALIFICATIONS

FBI assessors are active-duty agents who are selected to grade candidates who apply to become Special Agents of the FBI.

SIERRA 41 said FBI assessors are selected based on their propensity to prioritize diversity and inclusion over qualifications of the applicants. SIERRA 41 said this even applies to minority agents who request to become FBI assessors.

There was, according to SIERRA 41, a time when FBI assessors went through a renewal process to retain their positions as assessors. SIERRA 41 said the process appeared to weed out agents who prioritized the quality of candidates over diversity and inclusion, and this also applied to an assessor if he/she was a minority.

SIERRA 41 was reported to be appalled by this aspect of the FBI applicant recruitment process.

No additional information was provided.

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SOURCE: SIERRA 47

LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS

RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable | Unknown

ACCESS LEVEL: Direct | Indirect | Unknown

REPORTING HISTORY: Initial | # of Years (Decades Long)

COOPERATION TYPE: Knowing | Unknowing | Official

CORROBORATION LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document

On July 8, 2023 and August 15, 2023, the Reporting Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 83), a 25-plus year veteran of the FBI who as a high-ranking senior executive set the bar for professionalism and provided inspired, intelligent leadership for FBI Special Agents and task force members in connection with some of the most significant major cases in the history of the FBI, provided the following information obtained first-hand from a human source (Codename SIERRA 47):

SOURCE DESCRIPTION

SIERRA 47 is a highly decorated veteran of the FBI whose career spanned four decades. Well-respected by his/her peers in the law enforcement and intelligence communities, SIERRA 47 retired from the FBI following a distinguished career and transitioned into the private sector to (1) provide wide-ranging consulting services and (2) leadership defending U.S. National Security Interests against hostile and foreign threats.

SIERRA 47's historical perspective on FBI recruitment is based on first-hand personal and professional observations, and his/her reporting is considered highly reliable.

HISTORY OF FBI RECRUITMENT PRIORITIES

SIERRA 47 believed the FBI's transformation of its recruitment priorities was intentional and that it began with Former FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III (who served in that capacity from September 4, 2001 to September 4, 2013).

Priorities were intentionally designed, according to SIERRA 47, to change the "cowboy" culture of the FBI. SIERRA 47 said that initially, the focus was to expand the Bureau's relationships with

universities, colleges, and businesses, specifically through the Kellogg School of Management at Northwestern University headquartered in Evanston, Illinois.

SIERRA 47 further stated Director Mueller's successor, Former FBI Director James B. Comey (who served in that capacity from September 4, 2013 to May 9, 2017) accelerated those relationships.

SIERRA 47 said Directors Mueller and Comey, along with current FBI Director Christopher Wray (whose tenure as Director began on August 2, 2017), encouraged the FBI's move towards Gay Pride celebrations inside the FBI and eventually the full adoption of Diversity, Equity and Inclusion (DEI) to guide the FBI's hiring of personnel and promotion.

FBI EMPLOYEES WARNED DIRECTOR COMEY

SIERRA 47 said FBI employees warned Director Comey that the FBI was placed on the wrong course by Director Mueller.

That warning came in the form of a letter, dated July 16, 2013, authored by an FBI agent described by SIERRA 47 as very credible, and signed by hundreds of Bureau employees.

SIERRA 47 said Director Comey completely ignored the letter.

A copy of the letter was provided by SIERRA 47 and is included below:

Federal Bureau of Investigation

July 16, 2013

Dear Honorable Comey,

Thank you for your comments about us at your confirmation hearing. Employees of the FBI truly are "united by a fierce desire to do something good for [our] country." By all accounts, that fierce desire will report to you soon. It is both an amazing power and an awesome responsibility. Congratulations and welcome to the Bureau. You will find that FBI employees have an incredible capacity for perseverance and loyalty. We will pursue all leads to their logical end, not just clearing the tangled shrubs in the way, but paving new roads when necessary. Given a worthy Mission, we will march steadfastly and tirelessly, and we will keep marching at great personal sacrifice until the Mission is accomplished.

This letter is part of our march. Several of us have gathered to compile a brief welcome and a sincere plea which we hope to deliver, unfiltered, to your hands. Each of us comes from a unique perspective. We are Agents and Support staff,

Headquarters and Field Division employees. We are management and rank & file, some near departure, some just beginning our journey with the FBI. But we all have something in common: we share a hope that we will contribute great things to the FBI and one day retire, fondly leaving both the Bureau and the Nation a better place for our having been there. Our contribution lies not only in promoting the good within the FBI, but in recognizing and uprooting the bad; and in holding ourselves and our organization accountable to the citizens we are honored to serve.

We have taken this unconventional step of reaching out to you because we are convinced that we stand at a crossroad as an organization and as a Nation, and we cannot afford any further delay. Our concerns have a common thread: The FBI's true Mission of law enforcement/national security is so obscured by competing agendas that our effectiveness has been diminished. Decisions now pass through a lens of political correctness, expanding approval layers, and an inappropriate expense/improper distribution of resources.

There is also significant discrimination, despite (and ironically, as a result of) the prominence and ever-expanding activities of the FBI's office of Equal Employment Opportunity Affairs (OEEOA) and the Diversity and Inclusion Section. In the interest of time and space, we limit our examples:

• Political correctness. The FBI "Active Shooter Awareness" mandatory online training failed to mention that Nidal Hasan shouted "Allahu akbar" prior to his rampage, despite the testimony of eyewitnesses which was available and well-established at the time the training was produced. The subject matter expert (SME) and all those in the approval line allowed this inaccurate text and audio: "...the shooting at Fort Hood remains a mystery and investigators still do not have the exact motivation for the attack..." This statement was finally removed eight months after the problem was first brought to the attention of the responsible HQ unit by a Field Agent, but only after repeated contacts. Scant seconds can mean the difference between life and death in shootings. If another similar tragedy occurred, this time in Bureau space, would employees have been properly prepared? (EMPHASIS ADDED)

• Expanding management. A Special Agent in the field (pay grade GS-10 through GS-13) is three layers from the Director through a Supervisory Special Agent, Assistant Special Agent in Charge, and finally, a Special Agent in Charge. A Special Agent at FBIHQ (none with less than a GS-14 pay grade) is nine (9) layers from the Director, through a wearying maze of Unit Chiefs, Section Chiefs and their Assistants; as well as all the permutations of the Executive, Assistant and Deputy Directors and their respective Assistants.

Many Field Agents who accept 18 month Temporary Duty Assignments (TDY) and report to FBIHQ have claimed they are shocked by the culture of cowardice and self-preservation that keeps HQ locked in a loop of inefficiency. The most significant complaints: a) the additional layers work; b) some of HQ management are inexperienced and unsuited for their tasks, having either only been in the field briefly or having been at HQ for so long that they have forgotten how the field operates; c) those with no prior law enforcement or military experience (hired specifically to introduce a corporate mentality into the Bureau) often have no understanding about how to advance the Bureau Mission and are ineffective at best, obstructionist at worst.

- *Inappropriate budgetary expenses/improper distribution of resources. Bureaucracies and wasteful spending historically go hand-in-hand, but we refuse to accept that this is inevitable in the FBI. We recognize our real bosses are the American taxpayers, and we would like to see their money treated with greater respect. Not only would the dollars stretch farther, but decision-makers would be more careful about who and what was being paid out of the FBI budget. We would also encourage a closer inspection of the distribution of Special Agents (traditional criminal and cyber work vs. terrorism and intelligence work), inasmuch as it appears quotas are set for the assignment of resources, whether or not the work- load justifies the staffing level. Some additional budgetary issues follow:*

Special Agents earning GS-10 through GS-14 salaries are now spending nearly one-half of their time on administrative duties that used to be handled by GS-7, 8 or 9 support staff (i.e., scanning, indexing, uploading, and routing official Bureau documents; entering case evidence; recording time & attendance; documenting mileage; updating personal information; etc). In addition, some of the computer systems are so cumbersome that an entire day may be spent trying to accomplish what ought to have been completed in an hour. When one considers that there are well over 12,000 Special Agents, not only is the wasted money staggering; but the loss of time toward the investigative and intelligence-gathering effort is arguably comparable to an FBI with 6,000 fewer Agents on board.

In the midst of “sequestration,” with furloughs looming, there is money enough to fund projects that do not involve law enforcement or national security- many which are considered divisive and inflammatory. Some employees will argue that the FBI is overfunded and that the sequestration was a welcome relief. Just last month (dubbed “Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) Pride Month” in the FBI), the employees of one Division were encouraged to use their afternoon Bureau time to view a gay propaganda movie, followed by free food and a trivia game with prizes. When an agent dared to question the expenditure of scarce taxpayer resources on this, he was silenced by upper management and the event proceeded. (EMPHASIS ADDED)

This was by no means an isolated event. In just one Division, taxpayer monies have already paid the salaries of FBI employees who, on Bureau time, a) tutor students, b) make sandwiches at a local community food pantry, and c) engage in sporting events with inner city youth. In August of 2013, the same Division's employees will spend an entire day building a house, cleaning up residential areas and boarding up vacant buildings in a blighted neighborhood. These events, and others, are orchestrated as part of the FBI's "Community Outreach" program. This Outreach (a Bureau-wide initiative) has expanded from delivering anti-drug school lectures and hosting the "Citizens Academy," to supplementing the budgets of charities with FBI resources.

It should be noted that individual FBI employees must report any volunteer work they choose to do on their personal time to the Security Unit so that it can be reviewed for a potential conflict of interest. It is unclear how the FBI selects the charities (especially considering these amounts to an endorsement) and whether these entries or their leaders are vetted to try to minimize the chance of future scandal to the FBI. While we agree that charity work is vital to a compassionate society, we simply propose that it ought not to be done with the hard-earned taxpayer money that the government has collected for federal law enforcement and national security purposes.

This is particularly relevant now, at a time when some Agents complain about a lack of necessary training and supplies, and others bemoan the near abandonment of support to both remote Resident Agencies and the local Police and Sheriffs with whom we once enjoyed a close cooperative relationship. Our community outreach is most profoundly accomplished when we complete our mission with justice and fairness; when we excise the criminal element from a community, leaving the citizens to raise their families in peace; and when we convey to our colleagues in local law enforcement that we'll be there when they need us.

Every year, narrow categories of race (excluding white), national origin (excluding European), gender (excluding male) and sexual orientation (excluding heterosexual) each receive an entire month celebration replete with e-mails and color posters from FBIHQ panel discussions broadcast Bureau-wide, quizzes, movies, luncheons and award ceremonies. The entire budget, including staffing supplies, comes from the hard-earned tax dollars that are entrusted to the FBI for law enforcement and national security matters. Even the bonus money awarded to an SAC is based, in part, on how much he or she supports these off-Mission activities. The continuation of activities, advisory committees and promotions convey the impression that the budgets for the OEEOA and the "Diversity and Inclusion Section" have been unaffected by sequestration. We believe that both these HQ sections are counterproductive

and should be eliminated or reduced to the minimum required by any applicable law. As one Agent so aptly stated: "HQ wants us to be liked by everyone, both inside and outside the Bureau. I'd rather be respected. Our diverse make-up does not make us stronger, it just makes us different. Our accomplishments make us stronger." Incidentally, Agents who have died in the line of duty are only commemorated for one day out of the year.

- *Discrimination. The free exercise of religion is specifically protected in the constitution and identified in the civil Rights Act of 1964, yet the entire protected class of Religion is ignored or marginalized within the Bureau; whereas sexual orientation, which does not command the same legal protections as Religion, is celebrated with great fanfare. Those who adhere to Christianity are systematically offended, mistreated and discriminated against, often by the very people who took an oath to uphold the Constitution. One employee was instructed by a supervisor to remove Bible quotes placed on the employee's own office wall because they had "offended" a supporter of the LGBT agenda. Another employee was told she could not post her prayer meeting notice on the electronic billboard, although other groups were free to list their meetings and events. And every June, thousands of Christian FBI employees are forced to endure the FBI's active promotion of homosexuality, bisexuality and transexuality in the workplace, despite the fact that these lifestyles are contrary to their protected religious beliefs. Not only does this create a hostile work environment, but for those who find these celebrations inappropriate, nearly every announcement about an LGBT event technically meets the FBI's own definition for "sexual harassment." Offense Code 5.20 states: ...unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature by a...coworker...can constitute sexual harassment." The OEEOA and the Diversity and Inclusion Section's social-engineering agenda further aggravates by focusing all the attention of the categories' members on what they are and not what they have done to contribute to the law enforcement mission of the FBI. The result is disastrous, but HQ seems to be the only group that does not realize it. Common sense tells us that there can be no favoritism toward one class without necessarily offending another. Beyond illogical, this position is harmful to the Bureau by sowing the "victim" mindset in some and causing resentment in others who see the special treatment as arbitrary, unearned and undeserved.*

It needs to be said: In any workplace, in any discussion; the dignity of a person is reduced when they are told to rely on the color of their skin or the gender of their sex partner to gain respect and admiration. In a properly ordered organization, it is the character of a person and the quality of their contribution that ought to draw the attention of their colleagues. Moreover, the FBI is a law enforcement/national security agency- not a social service agency. We cannot

be everything to everyone and when we dedicate resources to issues that are unrelated to our true mission, we dilute our efforts and necessarily reduce our effectiveness. (EMPHASIS ADDED)

Fidelity, Bravery and Integrity. It is the motto of the FBI and something that should be at the very core of the Bureau's Mission, always and everywhere. The Bureau is still an amazing law enforcement and national security agency, full of dedicated employees who march valiantly to protect the citizens of this beloved Nation. We know that our work is ultimately good vs. evil and that anything that takes us away from this Mission is a diversion, a calculated distraction that makes us less than we ought to be. We pray that you recognize the dangerous territory into which the FBI has been purposefully led. It can only be corrected with Godly wisdom, strength and fortitude; and you have our prayers and our support as you embark on this historic journey.

The FBI once enjoyed the reputation as the finest law enforcement agency, serving the citizens of the greatest Nation on earth. We believe that place of honor is still within our reach. Godspeed Honorable Comey.

In your service, we remain,

*The committed employees of the FBI.
[signature page to follow]*

DIVERSITY, EQUITY & INCLUSION

The FBI's Office of Diversity and Inclusion was established in 2012, and in April 2021, a 23-year veteran of the FBI became the FBI's first Chief Diversity Officer. In an interview with Government Executive (<https://www.govexec.com/management/2021/12/fbis-scott-mcmillion-advancing-diversity-equity-inclusion-and-accessibility/187159/>), Scott McMillion praised Director Wray for placing DEI as a primary Bureau mission and aligning the FBI's goals with those of the Biden Administration.

SIERRA 47 believed Director Wray is prioritizing the recruitment of diversity candidates regardless of their qualifications.

Citing an April 21, 2018 online article posted by The Intercept entitled "*The FBI's Race Problems Are Getting Worse. The Prosecution of Terry Albury is Proof.*" (<https://theintercept.com/2018/04/21/terry-albury-fbi-race-whistleblowing/>), SIERRA 47 later added the FBI we knew of Fidelity, Bravery and Integrity is being transformed to the FBI of "Equity."

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

To provide additional historical perspective, SIERRA 47 said that going back to the Days of Rage and Weather Underground, the Communist ideology was very expressly laid out and that it is no accident, according to SIERRA 47, that to the letter of the ideology, plans for implementation in America and overall themes are identical to Critical Race Theory (CRT), the Woke ideology, and DEI.

SIERRA 47 believed the old KGB, today's Russian Intelligence Services, the Cubans, and the Chinese recruit to penetrate the FBI with people who are influenced by this indoctrination. For the FBI to now formally recruit heavily from these groups - a minority population heavily indoctrinated with anti-American hate - is a major National Security nightmare in motion.

No additional information was provided.

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SOURCE: SIERRA 15

LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS

RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable | Unknown

ACCESS LEVEL: Direct | Indirect | Unknown

REPORTING HISTORY: Initial | # of Years (More Than 30 years)

COOPERATION TYPE: Knowing | Unknowing | Official

CORROBORATION LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document

On August 13, 2023, the Reporting Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 41) is a highly decorated intelligence officer who as a member of multiple agencies in the U.S. Intelligence Community, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), provided analytical expertise and senior leadership both domestically and overseas to defend U.S. National Security interests. ROMEO PAPA 41 obtained the following information first-hand from a human source (Codename SIERRA 15):

SOURCE DESCRIPTION

SIERRA 15 has spent more than three decades working to counter threats to U.S. National Security interests, defend clients in the private sector against insider threats and espionage, and provide training as a certified instructor on intelligence and law enforcement matters. SIERRA 15 is an intelligence and security professional who as a proven leader served with distinction in the U.S. Intelligence Community. SIERRA 15's credibility is, without question, reliable, and he/she had direct access to the information detailed below.

COMPARING RECRUITMENT PRIORITIES

When asked how the FBI can best establish recruitment parameters for hiring effective and proficient Special Agents, SIERRA 15 responded by comparing the FBI's recruitment priorities to those of the CIA.

SIERRA 15 stated that unlike today's FBI where current Special Agent recruitment priorities appear to focus on fulfilling Diversity, Equity and Inclusion (DEI) mandates, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) remains committed to recruiting Clandestine Officers based on Threat Priorities, including Transnational Threats.

Citing reference material (<https://www.britannica.com/topic/transnational-threat>), SIERRA 15 defined Transnational Threats as *“security threats that do not originate in and are not confined to a single country. Terrorism organized international crime and the possible acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by nongovernmental groups are commonly cited as examples of transnational threats.”*

CIA DIRECTORATES

For background, SIERRA 15 said the CIA is composed of the Directorate of Intelligence; the National Clandestine Service, aka Directorate of Operations; the Directorate of Science and Technology; and the Directorate of Support and Logistics. All four directorates, according to SIERRA 15, work like a fine-toothed machine designed to receive and support each other’s operational missions.

SIERRA 15 said the Directorate of Intelligence and Directorate of Operations – the core missions of the CIA and its predecessor, the WWII era Office of Strategic Services (OSS) – are designed to detect and neutralize the over-the-horizon threats impacting U.S. National Security.

STEP ONE - IDENTIFYING THREAT PRIORITIES

SIERRA 15 said the CIA first identifies and prioritizes threats based on fundraising, logistical and operational strength of adversaries hostile to U.S. National Security interests, whether they be (1) a rogue nation state actor such as Russia, China, Iran, Venezuela, Cuba, or North Korea; (2) a transnational terrorist organization such as Al-Qaeda et al., Iran-funded Lebanese Hezbollah, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, the Islamic Resistance Movement (HAMAS), and/or the Islamic State (ISIS); or (3) transnational organized criminal organizations.

STEP TWO – MATCHING THE THREAT

SIERRA 15 said the threats are then matched with the CIA Clandestine Officers’ capabilities to spot, assess, and recruit sources, aka informants, assets, snitches, etc., while maintaining behavioral resolve, access/capability, and motive to provide credible reporting back to the U.S. Intelligence Community.

The CIA Clandestine Officer, according to SIERRA 15, can adapt to a myriad of cultures and languages while also possessing skills in cyber intrusion, weapons, explosives, and finance, as well as the ability to develop professional rapport to recruit the necessary sources to address intelligence gaps.

SIERRA 15 further stated that if needed, recruitment would further be enhanced through noted subject matter experts in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics) in the Directorate of Science and Technology and facilitated by intelligence analysts who specialize in global threats and logistical officers who help to expedite exfiltration of CIA officers and their informants.

ADAPTING TO THE CHANGING THREAT

SIERRA 15 said the U.S. Intelligence Community – listed here for the benefit of the novice reader – is composed of a myriad of U.S. Federal Agencies such as the CIA, DIA, NSA, NGIC, FBI, DEA, U.S. Secret Service, Treasury, Department of Energy, and others best positioned to generate sources in position to collect and fill intelligence gaps, enabling key decision makers to make operational decisions.

According to SIERRA 15, a basic tradecraft of becoming an operational officer in the U.S. Intelligence Community – whether it be a CIA Officer, an FBI Special Agent/Intelligence Analyst, or a DoD Special Operator - is to know how to fluidly adapt to the changing threat of our adversaries.

SIERRA 15 emphasized that adversaries are burdened not by bureaucratic policies but by the burden of overcoming hardened measures set forth by our national security apparatus of operators, agents, and analysts. SIERRA 15 said that when U.S. countermeasures fail to address the threat, our adversaries prevail.

HOUSTON, WE HAVE A PROBLEM AT THE FBI

SIERRA 15 said decorated, retired FBI Special Agents concerned about the FBI's degrading law enforcement and intelligence capabilities are reporting information generated from multiple sub-sources with access to first-hand information in FBI Field Offices throughout the country that indicates FBI Headquarters and Field Office management are bypassing the institutional recruitment regimen of spotting and assessing qualified applicants necessary to address our national security interests and focusing instead on meeting recent "woke" recruitment measures defined in Diversity, Equity and Inclusion (DEI) priorities.

While recognizing the importance of diversity in the workplace and significant strides that have been made since the days of Jim Crow policies instituted by the Democratic Party dating back to circa 1870, SIERRA 15 said it is also important to recruit applicants – to paraphrase Martin Luther King, Jr. – based on the content of their character and capabilities rather than the color of their skin.

ACCOUNTING, LAW, AND STEM

SIERRA 15 said historically, the FBI's primary recruitment priorities were based on hiring applicants possessing accounting and/or legal backgrounds. Later, according to SIERRA 15, the FBI broadened its recruitment parameters to focus on a diversified set of STEM backgrounds for Special Agents to meet the overarching threat of the transnational criminal and terrorist seeking to use advanced weapons and tactics against the United States.

SIERRA 15 said, however, that recent reporting incoming from FBI Field Offices indicate applicants are purposely targeted for recruitment and advancement into the FBI Academy for

Special Agent training because they identify as LGBTQ and/or are a minority that is below the qualified numbers set forth by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM).

The FBI, according to SIERRA 15, has always been cognizant of the importance of recruiting minority applicants, particularly in the post J. Edgar Hoover Era. However, those applicants for Special Agent positions simultaneously possessed legal, accounting and/or STEM backgrounds to meet the continuously evolving threat.

Providing additional historical perspective, SIERRA 15 stated the FBI and CIA have been the tip of the spear in neutralizing threats against U.S. National Security; and despite occasional failures in operational targeting to defeat the threat, consequences of those failures were mitigated by effective recruitment measures, enabling U.S. law enforcement and intelligence agencies to win the war despite battles lost.

THE WAY FORWARD

SIERRA 15 said that at the current time in our national security platform, the United States is confronted with a myriad of threats to include cyber, weapons of mass destruction, human trafficking, corruption, illegal narcotics, black market organ harvesting, and corporate and national security espionage. Among these transnational crimes, adversaries such as China, Russia, Iran, Cuba, and Venezuela are working in conjunction with transnational terrorist and organized crime organizations to target the United States.

SIERRA 15 said today's FBI – historically, the premier law enforcement and domestic intelligence agency – known for neutralizing the likes of spies from the above State/Non-state actors, dismantling Al-Qaeda networks and ceasing transnational drug operations perpetrated by organized crime – lacks the fortitude and skills warranted to defeat these threats in adversarial trenches, in cyber space, and in our own backyard. And if the current trajectory of FBI Special Agent recruitment continues – using DEI as the primary and sole measure – our homeland security efforts will be significantly hampered.

It is imperative, according to SIERRA 15, that the FBI recruit Special Agent applicants based on current threat priorities as outlined in the 56 quarterly FBI Domain Intelligence Reports, in addition to amplifying a robust intelligence cadre of field analysts that will accommodate the necessary requirement of operational cases.

SIERRA 15 recommended the FBI move away from a centralized mind think of headquarters policy and return to a decentralized operational setting that would enable the FBI to remain agile in addressing the liquid Transnational Threat.

No additional information was provided.

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C. REVIEW OF FBI SPECIAL AGENT HIRING STANDARDS OVER THE LAST 20 YEARS

SOURCE: SIERRA 91

LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS

RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable | Unknown

ACCESS LEVEL: Direct | Indirect | Unknown

REPORTING HISTORY: Initial | # of Years (Decades)

COOPERATION TYPE: Knowing | Unknowing | Official

CORROBORATION LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document

On September 7, 2023, the Reporting Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 38), a U.S. Military veteran and government attorney who also served as an FBI Intelligence Analyst for more than a decade, provided the following information obtained first-hand from a human source (Codename SIERRA 91):

SOURCE DESCRIPTION

SIERRA 91 is a retired U.S. Government (USG) employee with over 25 years of federal service, including five years or more of supervisory and management experience in the military or intelligence sectors of the USG. SIERRA 91's experience includes tours in Washington, D.C. where he/she was involved in evaluating and hiring federal civil service employees and contractors. SIERRA 91 is considered reliable, and he/she knowingly provided the following evaluation of FBI Special Agent recruiting and selection practices:

FBI SPECIAL AGENT HIRING STANDARDS

SIERRA 91 reviewed historical, publicly available standards used by the FBI to evaluate Special Agent applicants. The standards reviewed by SIERRA 91 were published online by the FBI between April 2001 and May 2022.

ILLICIT DRUG USE

SIERRA 91 noted the standards for the use of illicit drugs had been eased during this timeframe. For example, under the current standards, an FBI Special Agent applicant, according to SIERRA 91's review, could not have used marijuana within one year of his or her application for employment with the FBI, while the standards in April 2001 prohibited the use at any time of marijuana while employed in a position of public trust or the use of marijuana more than 15 times during the applicant's lifetime.

USE OF STEROIDS

SIERRA 91 reported that similarly, a lifetime of prior use of steroids more than five times was an employment disqualifier in 2001; but by 2022, FBI Special Agent hiring standards had been relaxed merely to no use of steroids within the preceding ten-year period, irrespective of the number of times steroids were used over the applicant's lifetime.

MINIMUM YEARS OF FULL-TIME WORK EXPERIENCE

SIERRA 91 also noted that published minimum standards had been slightly modified. In April 2001, the FBI recruited under four entry programs: Law, Accounting, Language and Diversified.

The "Diversified" program's minimum standards, SIERRA 91 reported, included a Bachelor of Science or Bachelor of Arts degree in any discipline and three years of full-time work experience or an advanced degree and two years of full-time work experience.

SIERRA 91 said that by May 2022, this requirement for FBI Special Agent applicants had been reduced to a college degree with only two years of full-time work experience and only one year of full-time work experience for holders of an advanced degree.

In SIERRA 91's opinion, shortening the full-time work experience criteria made it more difficult for the FBI to properly evaluate how an applicant's abilities measure up to the FBI's current eight (8) published Core Competencies: Collaboration, Communication, Flexibility and Adaptability, Initiative, Interpersonal Ability, Leadership, Organizing and Planning, and Problem Solving and Judgment.

SIERRA 91 stated that in many cases, deficiencies in these core competencies may not be apparent in only 24 months on the job, particularly entry-level positions held by candidates who are recruited and then apply for the position of FBI Special Agent.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PROPER EVALUATION

SIERRA 91 noted that while the published minimum criteria for eligibility had not dramatically changed between 2001 and 2023, the key to understanding whether the quality of the applicant pool had changed is to look not at the published minimum standards but to look instead at the actual educational and work accomplishments of the selected applicants over the past 20 years, as well as the top 10%-20% of candidates who were not selected.

SIERRA 91 said the FBI's implementation of the minimum standards in the selection process merely reflected the initial "cut" of the recruiting pool. The real criteria for selection, according to SIERRA 91, is more accurately reflected in the type and quality of the individual candidates who are selected, especially in comparison to those candidates who narrowly missed being selected.

No additional information was provided.

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D. THE CULTURE OF PHYSICAL FITNESS FAILURES AT THE FBI

SOURCE: SIERRA 35

LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS

RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable | Unknown

ACCESS LEVEL: Direct | Indirect | Unknown

REPORTING HISTORY: Initial | # of Years (More Than 30 Years)

COOPERATION TYPE: Knowing | Unknowing | Official

CORROBORATION LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document

On August 11, 2023, the Reporting Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 24), a 25-plus year veteran of the FBI who is considered by his/her peers as an exceptionally dedicated, hard-working crime fighter who investigated drug violations and who also provided a wide variety of training to FBI and other law enforcement personnel as a certified instructor, provided the following information obtained first-hand from a human source (Codename SIERRA 35):

SOURCE DESCRIPTION

SIERRA 35 served for more than 20 years as an FBI Special Agent and enjoyed a reputation in his/her Field Office as a good worker and stand-up agent who was not afraid to express his/her opinions. ROMEO PAPA 24 stated he/she has known SIERRA 35 for more than 30 years and rated SIERRA 35's reliability as absolute.

SIERRA 35 worked white collar crime matters, and he/she also worked in his/her Field Office's Applicant Unit, which gave SIERRA 35 direct access to the information detailed below.

PHYSICAL FITNESS STANDARDS

SIERRA 35 stated mandatory Physical Fitness standards are being relaxed at the FBI. Field Office Applicant Coordinators, according to SIERRA 35, are giving candidates multiple attempts to pass the Physical Fitness Test (PFT) in the Field before the candidates are approved to report for New Agents Training at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia.

SIERRA 35 said that in more recent years, he/she has had a negative opinion of many candidates who apply to become FBI Special Agents because they show up completely out of shape despite knowing the Physical Fitness standards in advance. SIERRA 35 said many are entitled and need to be spoon-fed and have their hands held.

SIERRA 35 advised they are even running physical fitness pre-training programs for desired candidates.

MILITARY VETERANS

SIERRA 35 stated they no longer go out of their way to recruit military veterans. "Meet And Greet" events were not being used to attract military veterans in the same way they are used to attract civilians or other applicants with no military background.

No additional information was provided.

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SOURCE: SIERRA 77

LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS

RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable | Unknown

ACCESS LEVEL: Direct | Indirect | Unknown

REPORTING HISTORY: Initial | # of Years (More Than 20 Years)

COOPERATION TYPE: Knowing | Unknowning | Official

CORROBORATION LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document

On August 14, 2023, the Reporting Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 25), a military veteran who served for more than 25 years as an FBI Special Agent and who as a proven leader is highly respected by his/her peers at all levels of the law enforcement community throughout the country, provided the following information obtained first-hand from a human source (Codename SIERRA 77):

SOURCE DESCRIPTION

SIERRA 77 is a 20-plus year veteran of the FBI who served in a variety of leadership roles. SIERRA 77 was known for his/her attention to detail and was highly respected as an agent. ROMEO PAPA 25 described SIERRA 77 as one of the most intelligent people he/she has ever met, and ROMEO PAPA 25 characterized SIERRA 77's credibility as beyond reproach.

SIERRA 77's reporting detailed below is indirect, based on conversations SIERRA 77 had with individuals currently employed by the FBI.

LOWER QUALITY CANDIDATES

Speaking at length with ROMEO PAPA 25, SIERRA 77 said lower quality candidates are being hired by today's FBI to become FBI Special Agents, and SIERRA 77 said the issue is national in scope.

SIERRA 77 further stated he/she learned from active-duty agents that applicants who have not achieved minimum physical fitness scores during testing in the Field are still allowed in today's FBI to advance in the hiring process and report to the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia for New Agents Training.

OVERRULED BY FBI HEADQUARTERS

SIERRA 77 said he/she was advised that when applicant coordinators and background investigators raised objections to allowing these applicants to move forward in the hiring process, they were overruled by FBI Headquarters.

PAST SELECTION PRACTICES

In the past, according to SIERRA 77, if an unqualified applicant was given the green light by the Field to report to Quantico for New Agents Training, the Division Head of the Field Office where the applicant was processed would receive a phone call and be admonished.

NOTE: Adding to SIERRA 77's reporting, ROMEO PAPA 25 said that in the past, there was an abundance of qualified candidates in the applicant pool; and in that context, ROMEO PAPA 25 reported having direct knowledge of multiple instances when, in the past, calls were made to Division Heads of Field Offices where applicants were processed if the applicants performed POORLY (emphasis added) during New Agents Training at Quantico. ROMEO PAPA 25 recalled one instance when an Applicant Coordinator in a Field Office was removed from his/her position as Applicant Coordinator for sending an unqualified candidate to Quantico.

According to SIERRA 77, the opposite is true today. When candidates who fail to achieve the minimum physical fitness score are NOT (emphasis added) recommended for selection as FBI Special Agents, a call would often be made and the decision overruled by FBI Headquarters.

SIERRA 77 said below-minimum physical fitness scores were not the only reasons applicant coordinators and background investigators would not recommend candidates for advancement in the hiring process. Some applicants, according to SIERRA 77, required additional background investigation or investigations revealed some applicants did not possess the appropriate character or professional experience. For these reasons, objections would be raised by applicant coordinators and background investigators, and again, FBI Headquarters would often overrule and order the applicants to report to Quantico for New Agents Training.

KEEPING UP THE NUMBERS

SIERRA 77 said lower qualified candidates are being hired by today's FBI to keep the numbers up. That's the only way SIERRA 77 could rationalize this trend. Hiring only qualified candidates would mean lower numbers, and SIERRA 77 was described by ROMEO PAPA 25 as being disappointed that this is the way things are going in today's FBI.

No additional information was provided.

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E. NEW AGENT TRAINEE ISSUES AT THE FBI ACADEMY

SOURCE: SIERRA 48

LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS

RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable | Unknown

ACCESS LEVEL: Direct | Indirect | Unknown

REPORTING HISTORY: Initial | # of Years (More Than 20)

COOPERATION TYPE: Knowing (and Voluntary) | Unknowing | Official

CORROBORATION LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document

On August 6, 2023, the Reporting Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 56), a former local prosecutor who also served for more than 20 years as an FBI Special Agent, provided the following information obtained first-hand and voluntarily from a human source (Codename SIERRA 48):

SOURCE DESCRIPTION

SIERRA 48 is a retired FBI veteran who served for more than 20 years as an FBI Special Agent, Supervisory Special Agent (SSA), and staff instructor at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia.

SIERRA 48's reliability, trustworthiness, and competence have been verified by other FBI Agents, and SIERRA 48's level of access was direct when engaged in teaching New Agent Trainees (NATs) at the FBI Academy. SIERRA 48 has commented to other FBI employees on the following issues, which occurred between 2005 and 2010 or shortly thereafter.

ISSUE ONE - CLINICAL DEPRESSION

During SIERRA 48's tenure as an FBI Academy staff instructor, SIERRA 48 was contacted by a NAT Counselor who advised of a problem with a NAT under SIERRA 48's instructional purview.

SIERRA 48, along with the NAT Counselor, interviewed the NAT who was visibly upset and crying. When queried by SIERRA 48, the NAT advised that he/she was having boyfriend/girlfriend ("significant other") issues. SIERRA 48 further queried the NAT about the issue and learned that

the NAT was experiencing a sense of loss due to the separation from the NAT's significant other. SIERRA 48 was not able to elicit any information about what caused the NAT to suffer the emotional reaction the NAT experienced.

The NAT calmed down during the discussion, but during the discussion, NAT disclosed that he/she was suffering from clinical depression and was under the care of a medical professional.

After the interview/discussion with the NAT was complete, SIERRA 48 questioned the NAT's Counselor and expressed a degree of alarm about the NAT's suitability to engage in new agent training due to the disclosed clinical depression diagnosis. The Counselor advised that the issue was known to the Bureau and the NAT in question had been "cleared" to engage in new agent training by the FBI psychologist/psychiatrist.

SIERRA 48 was astounded that the NAT would be allowed to engage in new agent training, especially with access to firearms. The NAT Counselor reiterated the NAT had been cleared and that the Academy viewed the issue as settled.

ISSUE TWO - SELF-HATE AND RAGE

SIERRA 48 was advised by a fellow staff instructor (Fellow SSA) at the FBI Academy that the Fellow SSA witnessed a NAT whose hands were cut on the back of the palms. The Fellow SSA, in conversation with SIERRA 48, advised that the Fellow SSA queried the NAT as to the cause of the injuries. The NAT said the injuries were the result of physical training in the FBI Academy Gymnasium.

Shortly after that discussion, the Fellow SSA said he/she again witnessed the same NAT with additional injuries to the back of the NAT's hands. The injuries required bandaging. The Fellow SSA again asked the NAT about the cause of the injuries. The NAT advised the Fellow SSA that the NAT was physically punching the wall of the FBI Academy Gymnasium. Fellow SSA asked the NAT why the NAT engaged in that kind of behavior. The NAT replied, "Because I am filled with self-hate and rage."

The Fellow SSA reported that conversation to the NAT's Staff Counselor. The NAT Staff Counselor (who was a different Counselor from the one described in Issue One above) then confronted the NAT.

The NAT left the FBI Academy shortly thereafter for a holiday break. The NAT did not return to the FBI Academy at the appointed time.

SIERRA 48 was later contacted by SIERRA 48's Unit Chief who advised SIERRA 48 to evaluate the NAT with a view towards reintegrating the NAT into an existing NAT class. SIERRA 48 objected to the Unit Chief's directive and cited concerns about the NAT's mental condition. SIERRA 48 was ordered to conduct the evaluation whether SIERRA 48 wanted to or not. SIERRA 48 complied with the Unit Chief's order.

The NAT failed to appear for the evaluation at the appointed time, and SIERRA 48 reported this failure to appear to the Unit Chief.

No further information was provided on this issue.

ISSUE THREE – FOREIGN ARMED FORCES

SIERRA 48 and another Fellow SSA (distinct from the Fellow SSA listed above) engaged another NAT in conversation related to their instructional responsibilities and learned that this NAT had served as an adult in the armed services of a former Soviet bloc European country.

The NAT further disclosed that he/she emigrated to the United States as an adult in his/her early twenties.

SIERRA 48 and the Fellow SSA expressed concern to their chain of command but were advised the FBI Academy was not a “deselection” type of academy and that they were not to be concerned about the NAT or his/her background.

After completing new agent training, the NAT married another NAT (NAT’s Spouse) who was known to SIERRA 48 and the Fellow SSA.

The NAT’s Spouse later recounted to SIERRA 48 and the Fellow SSA a series of domestic issues between the two NATs that involved the threatened removal of the couple’s child from the U.S. The NAT’s Spouse also said the NAT was romantically involved with a foreign national and that the relationship was unreported. There was other questionable behavior that while unclear, suggested a concern regarding the NAT’s continuing suitability for FBI employment.

The NAT’s Spouse later told the Fellow SSA that the NAT left the employment of the FBI.

No additional information was provided.

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SOURCE: SIERRA 32

LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS

RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable | Unknown

ACCESS LEVEL: Direct | Indirect | Unknown

REPORTING HISTORY: Initial | # of Years (25)

COOPERATION TYPE: Knowing | Unknowing | Official

CORROBORATION LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document

On July 25, 2023, the Reporting Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 21), a U.S. Marine Corps veteran with deployments to multiple countries throughout Europe and who later served across four decades as a highly decorated FBI Special Agent, provided the following information obtained first-hand from a human source (Codename SIERRA 32):

SOURCE DESCRIPTION

SIERRA 32 is a veteran of the FBI who served for more than 20 years in major FBI Field Offices throughout the country. SIERRA 32 worked in a number of investigative and administrative areas, including work as an Undercover Agent. SIERRA 32 received numerous commendations for his/her dedicated FBI service from local, state, and federal law enforcement organizations.

SIERRA 32 also served in a supervisory role at the New Agents Training Unit (NATU), FBI Academy, Quantico, Virginia. During this time, SIERRA 32 had direct access to behavioral, performance-related, and other pertinent information regarding New Agent Trainees (NATs) and is in a unique position to provide both a historical and contemporary perspective on recruitment at the FBI.

Following his/her retirement from the FBI, SIERRA 32 served in support of U.S. Department of Defense and other U.S. Government operations overseas as a law enforcement advisor and trainer.

WEEDS IN THE GARDEN

SIERRA 32 stated his/her experience with recruitment in the FBI was probably like those of many other Agents. There was always, according to SIERRA 32, a small percentage of recruits

who made one scratch one's head trying to figure out how they got in. SIERRA 32 described them as "Weeds in the Garden."

During SIERRA 32's time as a supervisor at NATU, NATU classes had as many as 48 trainees. SIERRA 32 said that without fail, there were between two and six New Agent Trainees (NATs) in each class who would "fail" out of class. SIERRA 32 said he/she saw trainees resign in the first week, and SIERRA 32 further stated these trainees said they did not know they would have to carry a gun.

SIERRA 32 said other NATs were physically weak, referring to their hand strength. They could not, according to SIERRA 32, hold up a pistol to shoot, and SIERRA 32 said they were mostly females. SIERRA 32 stated emphatically this was true.

SIERRA 32 stated other NATs were not physically fit, could not run, do sit-ups or pull-ups.

SIERRA 32 said other trainees were not smart enough and failed their written exams.

SIERRA 32 said he/she placed the blame on the FBI Field Offices for recruiting applicants with weak hand strength or those who could not run two miles or did not know they had to carry a gun.

CHANGING TIMES

SIERRA 32 stated that as times changed, the FBI had to change its recruiting, and SIERRA 32 said he/she later assisted with recruiting efforts. The FBI, at the time, focused on recruiting candidates with a background in Information Technology (IT), and when SIERRA 32 spoke to classes, the students asked what the (FBI Special Agent) base pay was. SIERRA 32 stated it was approximately \$45,000. SIERRA 32 said they all laughed at him/her because they were being offered twice that amount for entry-level jobs elsewhere.

TODAY'S NEW AGENT TRAINEES

In 2023, SIERRA 32 visited the FBI Academy. SIERRA 32 spoke with a NAT who stuttered and appeared to have Tourette Syndrome or other tic disorder that hindered the NAT's ability to communicate. SIERRA 32 wondered how this NAT would function in a high-threat, hostile environment.

SIERRA 32 said the NATs he/she saw at the FBI Academy were a mix of different races, 60% male and 40% female. According to SIERRA 32, the FBI Academy Staff advised SIERRA 32 that they still have a small percentage of NATs who seem to sneak through and who should not be there at the FBI Academy.

DECREASE IN RECRUITING CASE LOAD

SIERRA 32 stated he/she spoke to an FBI recruiter whose identity was not disclosed. The recruiter advised SIERRA 32 that in the past, they (the recruiter and fellow recruiters) each had between 18 to 20 (applicant) cases. In the last couple of years, the case load, according to the recruiter, dropped down to between three and four cases, indicating a notable decrease in the number of candidates applying to the FBI.

LOWER CALIBER OF RECRUITS

SIERRA 32 said recruiting is picking up now, but the caliber of recruits seems to have fallen. SIERRA 32 further stated the FBI does not appear to be getting experienced, “mature” candidates, such as the former cop, former military person, the professional career person, the lawyer, accountant, or engineer.

YOUNG AND IMMATURE

The focus, according to SIERRA 32, appears to be on IT, but SIERRA 32 described the candidates as young and immature. SIERRA 32 said the FBI has to accept people with sketchy backgrounds.

SIERRA 32 said the Government norm regarding illicit drug use currently is an applicant cannot have smoked marijuana within the previous 12 months. Hard drugs are still out, according to SIERRA 32. SIERRA 32 said he/she was advised by a friend that questionable sexual conduct seems to be falling off the table (as grounds for disqualification).

BACKGROUND CHECKS

SIERRA 32 said background checks on FBI applicants can only be conducted on immediate family members, spouse, parents, and siblings. Everyone else, according to SIERRA 32, is off limits. SIERRA 32 said his/her friend said that is crazy. The friend went on to say he/she (the friend) saw/felt something off on a couple of candidates and went outside the scope of the investigation. The friend, according to SIERRA 32, found one candidate who had foreign intelligence contacts and one who had an “in-law” who was selling drugs to inmates. SIERRA 32 said these derogatory findings would not have been discovered if SIERRA 32’s friend had not gone outside the scope of the interviews.

SIERRA 32 said the Bureau seems to be willing to make exceptions or look the other way when it comes down to some applicant backgrounds.

No additional information was provided.

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F. POOR WRITING SKILLS OF FBI SPECIAL AGENTS & NEW AGENT TRAINEES

SOURCE: SIERRA 67

LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS

RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable | Unknown

ACCESS LEVEL: Direct | Indirect | Unknown

REPORTING HISTORY: Initial | # of Years (More Than 20 Years)

COOPERATION TYPE: Knowing | Unknowing | Official

CORROBORATION LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document

On August 12, 2023, the Reporting Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 19), a 20-plus year veteran of the FBI who investigated white collar crime, served as a Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) at FBI Headquarters, and who was known by his/her peers as a hard-working, conscientious and dedicated crime fighter, provided the following information obtained first-hand from a human source (Codename SIERRA 67):

SOURCE DESCRIPTION

SIERRA 67 served for more than 20 years as an FBI Special Agent and Supervisory Special Agent (SSA). SIERRA 67's access to the information provided below is direct, and his/her reporting is considered, without question, reliable.

APPLICANT NUMBERS DECREASED

SIERRA 67 learned that after all of the bad press the FBI received after James B. Comey became FBI Director (on September 4, 2013) and stories were published about Former FBI Deputy Director Andrew McCabe, Former FBI Attorney Lisa Page, Former FBI Deputy Assistant Director Peter Strzok and others, the applicant numbers decreased significantly while retirements increased.

AGE RESTRICTION WAIVED

SIERRA 67 said waiving the age restriction allowed for massive numbers of older military veterans and FBI support employees to apply for FBI Special Agent positions. SIERRA 67 said applicants in their 40s and 50s were being accepted as New Agent Trainees (NATs) at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia and then graduating as Special Agents.

FBI SUPPORT EMPLOYEES

SIERRA 67 was advised the age restriction was waived for FBI support employees because background investigations for them were already completed, transfer costs were not incurred because the support employees would be ordered back to their respective Field Offices after completing New Agent Training at the FBI Academy, and the FBI would, as a result, save a considerable amount of money.

PROBATIONARY PERIOD SHORTENED

According to SIERRA 67, the probationary period for New Agents who previously served in the military is only one year instead of two.

NEW AGENT COULD NOT WRITE

SIERRA 67 said that in approximately 2018, a disabled Veteran in his/her late 40s graduated from the FBI Academy as a Special Agent and was assigned to an FBI Field Office near the city where the Veteran already resided.

SIERRA 67 said it became clear to this New Agent's squad members and the Supervisory Special Agent (SSA) that the New Agent was not capable of writing basic reports (FD-302s, ECs, etc.) or making sound decisions. Squad members, according to SIERRA 67, liked this New Agent as a person, but they could not rely on him/her to complete the normal amount of work.

According to SIERRA 67, the New Agent was used as a "helper." The New Agent would be the second agent present during an interview. The agent could make photocopies and put binders together. The New Agent could sit on a surveillance.

SIERRA 67 said the training agent assigned to this New Agent did not want to provide the New Agent any constructive criticism regarding his/her inability to interview or write reports because the training agent did not want to "make waves" or "hurt (the New Agent's) feelings."

SIERRA 67 said that when these issues were brought to the SSA's attention, the issues were ignored and overlooked.

The New Agent, according to SIERRA 67, was given menial tasks and was eventually transferred to a full-time surveillance squad. SIERRA 67 said the New Agent was given good marks on his/her file reviews, and it is believed the agent had no idea that his/her lack of ability was ever brought to his/her attention.

SIERRA 67 learned one reason the FBI likes to hire Veterans is because they are good at following orders and following the chain of command.

EEO COMPLAINTS

SIERRA 67 said FBI Management is hesitant to act on incompetence in cases like this because Equal Employment Opportunity complaints (EEOs) are quite prevalent. Agents, SSAs, Assistant Special Agents In Charge, Special Agents In Charge, or any FBI employees do not want EEOs because that can stop their ability to move up the ladder. Consequently, many SSAs avoid conflict and are more concerned with everyone liking them.

SIERRA 67 further stated incompetent or problem agents are not held responsible for their lack of work, and this affects morale negatively. This, according to SIERRA 67, has been going on in the FBI for many years.

LESS WORK EXPERIENCE

SIERRA 67 said New Agent Trainees (NATs) at the FBI Academy ranged in age from early 20s to 50s.

According to SIERRA 67, the longstanding requirement of three (3) years minimum (pre-FBI) work experience was decreased to two (2) years or less depending on the person, and working on a Master's Degree could count as work experience.

SIERRA 67 said there were NATs who never had any professional work experience but had received a Bachelor's Degree and were working on a Master's Degree.

LACK OF MATURITY

Regarding NATs younger than 25 years old, SIERRA 67 said the lack of maturity due to limited work and life experiences contributed to drama during New Agent training.

MINORITY CLASS LEADERS

SIERRA 67 said for each New Agents Class, a Class Leader was selected by the Class Staff.

SIERRA 67 said there was pressure or an attempt to choose a minority NAT for the Class Leader to emphasize Diversity and Inclusion, but it could not be obvious. For instance, according to SIERRA 67, if there were no minorities in the class who passed the first Physical Fitness Test (PFT), they could not be chosen as the Class Leader. However, if the choice was between two NATs and one was a minority, the minority would be chosen.

FIRST OFFICE ORDERS

During New Agent Training, NATs submit their choices for the FBI Field Offices they would prefer to be first assigned after graduation from the FBI Academy. SIERRA 67 said the majority of NATs received orders to one of their top three first office choices.

No additional information was provided.

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SOURCE: SIERRA 11

LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS

RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable | Unknown

ACCESS LEVEL: Direct | Indirect | Unknown

REPORTING HISTORY: Initial | # of Years (Many)

COOPERATION TYPE: Knowing | Unknowing | Official

CORROBORATION LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document

On July 31, 2023, the Reporting Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 73), a 30-plus year veteran of the FBI who led complex criminal investigations and who over the course of more than a decade developed expertise conducting private investigations, provided the following information obtained first-hand from a human source (Codename SIERRA 11):

SOURCE DESCRIPTION

SIERRA 11 is a 10-plus year veteran of the FBI with experience as (1) an aggressive criminal agent working violent crime and money laundering matters, and (2) as a training agent, which at the time provided SIERRA 11 with direct access to the information detailed below.

SIERRA 11 works at the highest level and has received awards for work performance and case complexity. SIERRA 11 also generated a high number of statistics and assets seized/claimed. SIERRA 11 has a military background and is currently an FBI Supervisory Special Agent.

ROMEO PAPA 73 has known SIERRA 11 for years. They worked the same federal violations, are friends outside of work, and they share similar personal interests. ROMEO PAPA 73 described SIERRA 11's reliability as unequivocal.

NEW AGENT ATTITUDE

Approximately two years ago, SIERRA 11 was frustrated and provided unsolicited information during a casual conversation. SIERRA 11 advised that generally the new agents coming through, both females and males, seem to have a superiority attitude and do not want to take direction from their training agents. Many have military backgrounds, and according to SIERRA 11, these new agents "know it all."

POOR WRITING SKILLS

Citing a specific incident, SIERRA 11 said he/she was correcting the report writing of a new agent and in the process provided feedback to the new agent on the new agent's writing skills. SIERRA 11 advised the new agent that his/her writing skills needed improvement and that the new agent needed to pay attention to detail.

The new agent, according to SIERRA 11, went to the supervisor and complained about SIERRA 11 being too difficult and expecting too much.

INCOMPLETE CASE WORK

Citing another incident, SIERRA 11 said a new agent was given tasks to accomplish in connection with a particular case. Not only did the new agent not perform the tasks requested, SIERRA 11 said the new agent, without SIERRA 11's knowledge, went instead to other squads to ask if they needed help with their cases.

MILITARY BACKGROUND

Having a military background, SIERRA 11 said he/she was very disappointed in the new agents who have been hired, especially those with backgrounds in the military. Because of the negative experience with new agents, SIERRA 11 said he/she has decided not to handle new agent training in the future.

No additional information was provided.

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SOURCE: SIERRA 37

LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS

RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable | Unknown

ACCESS LEVEL: Direct | Indirect | Unknown

REPORTING HISTORY: Initial | # of Years (Exact # Unknown)

COOPERATION TYPE: Knowing | Unknowning | Official

CORROBORATION LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document

On August 6, 2023, the Reporting Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 56), a former local prosecutor who also served for more than 20 years as an FBI Special Agent, provided the following information obtained first-hand from a human source (Codename SIERRA 37):

SOURCE DESCRIPTION

SIERRA 37 is a 20-plus year veteran of the FBI, with service as a Special Agent, Supervisory Special Agent (SSA), and staff instructor at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia.

ROMEO PAPA 56 has verified SIERRA 37's reliability, trustworthiness, and competence; and SIERRA 37's level of access was direct when engaged in teaching New Agent Trainees (NATs). SIERRA 37 has made comments to ROMEO PAPA 56 regarding the following subject matter during various conversations over a period of years.

POOR WRITING SKILLS

SIERRA 37 reported that a number of NATs have significant difficulty writing in a coherent manner. SIERRA 37 further stated NATs often fail to utilize proper capitalization, punctuation, and sentence structure, and they generally have a difficult time reducing to writing information gathered during NAT training exercises.

LOWER QUALITY FBI NEW AGENT TRAINEES

SIERRA 37 said the quality of NATs in terms of suitability for employment as an FBI Special Agent is significantly lower than the quality of NATs of years past.

SIERRA 37 noted an increase in the number of former teachers entering the FBI workforce.

No additional information was provided.

#####

SOURCE: SIERRA 79

LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS

RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable | Unknown

ACCESS LEVEL: Direct | Indirect | Unknown

REPORTING HISTORY: Initial | # of Years (Decades Long)

COOPERATION TYPE: Knowing | Unknowing | Official

CORROBORATION LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document

On August 11, 2023, the Reporting Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 24), a 25-plus year veteran of the FBI who is considered by his/her peers as an exceptionally dedicated, hard-working crime fighter who investigated drug violations and who also provided a wide variety of training to FBI and other law enforcement personnel as a certified instructor, provided the following information obtained first-hand from a human source (Codename SIERRA 79):

SOURCE DESCRIPTION

SIERRA 79's service as an FBI Special Agent stretched across four decades. SIERRA 79 is also highly respected as a criminal investigator. SIERRA 79's access to the information provided is direct, and his/her reporting is considered, without question, reliable.

AGENT COULD NOT WRITE

SIERRA 79 recalled the story of a minority female FBI Special Agent who previously served in the U.S. Armed Forces. The agent's race and branch of the military in which the agent served were not disclosed here to protect the agent's identity.

SIERRA 79 said the agent arrived in his/her first FBI Field Office straight out of the FBI Academy and "could not compose a simple FD-302." The FD-302 is an FBI Interview Report Form.

According to SIERRA 79, the agent's writing skills were so poor, the agent was sent to a local college to take remedial English classes.

SIERRA 79 said the agent never made a case or wrote an affidavit and had to be pulled along to support investigations conducted by the agent's squad.

SIERRA 79 further stated he/she doesn't believe the agent ever testified because the agent could not be trusted in court.

WE NEED "QUALIFIED" MINORITY FEMALE AGENTS

SIERRA 79 said that during the agent's probationary period, the agent's supervisor went up the chain of command to the supervisor's Assistant Special Agent In Charge (ASAC) to request that the agent be terminated from employment as a Special Agent.

The ASAC, who also happened to be the same race as the agent, advised the supervisor that – paraphrasing here - we need minority female agents.

In response, the supervisor told the ASAC – again, paraphrasing here - we need "qualified" minority female agents.

SIERRA 79 believed other agents in the office of all ethnic backgrounds took notice of the agent's glaring, below average performance. Their general reaction, according to SIERRA 79, ranged from embarrassment, head shakes, stunned silence, to begrudging acknowledgement that they and the FBI were stuck with the agent.

TROUBLED CAREER

The agent, according to SIERRA 79, went on to have a troubled, on-and-off career as an FBI Special Agent because of character and integrity issues.

Additional details of the agent, career path, and personal life were not disclosed to protect the agent's identity.

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G. GENERAL QUALITY DECLINE OF FBI SPECIAL AGENTS

SOURCE: SIERRA 23

LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS

RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable | Unknown

ACCESS LEVEL: Direct | Indirect | Unknown

REPORTING HISTORY: Initial | # of Years (7)

COOPERATION TYPE: Knowing | Unknowning | Official

CORROBORATION LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document

On August 4, 2023, the Reporting Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 45), a retired FBI Special Agent whose 20-plus years of service included leadership as a Supervisory Special Agent and who now works as a Senior Corporate Security Executive, provided the following information obtained first-hand from a human source (Codename SIERRA 23):

SOURCE DESCRIPTION

SIERRA 23 has served for more than four years as a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is currently investigating terrorism matters. SIERRA 23 is an outstanding, hard-working, persistent, and diligent employee with high ethical standards. SIERRA 23 has a passion for serving our country.

SIERRA 23 contacted ROMEO PAPA 45 to ask for advice on quitting the FBI and tips on seeking another career outside of government service. SIERRA 23 is weary of today's FBI, which is woke, political, and an agency that no longer follows its motto of "Fidelity, Bravery, and Integrity." SIERRA 23 said he/she is a Libertarian and can care less about his/her co-worker's political beliefs unless they influence their decision-making at work.

FBI DOES NOT ATTRACT OR HIRE THE BEST

Since SIERRA 23 has become an Agent, he/she has observed that the FBI does not hire the best applicants or promote the best leaders. SIERRA 23 said the FBI is now a joke among other law enforcement agencies because of its apparent investigative failures, political targeting of

certain individuals/groups, and woke adoption. SIERRA 23 said the FBI is considering hiring candidates not accepted by other law enforcement agencies.

Specifically, Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) requires applicants who lateral over to its agency to have an Assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA) vouch that an 1811 (Criminal Investigations Series) applicant has taken a case to trial as a major criterion for consideration. SIERRA 23 knows of new FBI Agents who were rejected by other law enforcement agencies for one reason or another but were able to become FBI Special Agents.

LAZY, ENTITLED AGENTS

SIERRA 23 said new FBI Agents are generally lazy, entitled, not passionate about serving our country, and need to have the attitude of doing what is best for the FBI. SIERRA 23 spoke to several newly hired Agents who say they want to get the letters “FBI” on their resumes so they can go on to something better, or they “want to fight white supremacy” and “MAGA conservatives.”

NO ACCOUNTABILITY

SIERRA 23 said there is almost no accountability from leadership to uphold work ethic, conduct priority investigations, or maintain physical fitness and firearms standards. He/she said morale is “very low” among the Agents and other employees who want to do the right thing, work hard, and maintain high-level professionalism at the agency.

UNPROFESSIONAL ATTIRE

SIERRA 23 said most new Agents rarely wear professional attire to the office or when they go out to conduct investigations. These Agents, according to SIERRA 23, dress like they work at a tech start-up company and need to learn how to wear their guns securely and tactically. SIERRA 23 said they seem more concerned about pushing the envelope of what they can get away with by showing their wokeness, tattoos, and different hair color.

DIVERSITY OVER COMPETENCE

SIERRA 23 has no confidence in working with most new Agents since they do not appear tactically competent and have questionable physical fitness. SIERRA 23 said today’s FBI is concerned more about diversity over competence.

FBI SWAT SELECTION

SIERRA 23 said that approximately a year ago, two female Agents refused to engage in instructor-directed mutual combat as part of the formal selection process for the field office’s SWAT Team. The SWAT instructors recommended failing the two female SWAT candidates, but according to SIERRA 23, either FBI Headquarters or the field office’s Executive Management

overruled the instructors' recommendations. The two female candidates were allowed to continue to the next evolution of the screening process.

Another SWAT candidate - who was smaller in stature and who overcame larger opponents because of this candidate's drive to become a member of the SWAT Team - was not selected. This candidate was reported to be upset about not being selected because the candidate believed less competent individuals took the remaining slots because of their races and sexes.

LIBERAL AND RACIAL BIAS

SIERRA 23 believes that if you are conservative and/or white male or female, the FBI will treat you harshly for the same offense committed by a minority, gay, or transsexual employee. SIERRA 23 said Field Agents who want to investigate self-generated cases are often hampered by administrative tasks and politically driven cases such as January 6th and anti-abortion protestors. SIERRA 23 said it seems FBIHQ is driving more investigations than the field offices that are investigating legitimate crimes and threats impacting its regions.

INEXPERIENCED, SELFISH LEADERS

SIERRA 23 said he/she is a member of a squad that carries actual cases that produce statistical accomplishments. SIERRA 23 served as the Principal Relief Supervisor since his/her Supervisory Special Agent (SSA, the squad supervisor) has taken months to go to the Inspection Division for promotion and taken time for family leave. SIERRA 23 said the SSA is a typical example of what is wrong with today's FBI.

This SSA, according to SIERRA 23, has approximately seven years on the job and was promoted to squad supervisor with little practical case experience and leadership background. SIERRA 23 repeatedly educated the SSA on the investigative process, policies, and how to take a case to trial. This individual is more interested in his/her next promotion than serving as a mentor for the squad.

LOW QUALITY AGENTS

SIERRA 23 said most of the Agents disappear during the day, go home early, or never want to work late for after-hours operations. SIERRA 23 does not trust most of the Agents with his/her life since they have questionable competence, tactical abilities, and work ethic. SIERRA 23 never expected the quality of the Agents and employees in his/her field office to be so low.

No additional information was provided, and the conversation was concluded.

#####

SOURCE: SIERRA 17

LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS

RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable | Unknown

ACCESS LEVEL: Direct | Indirect | Unknown

REPORTING HISTORY: Initial | # of Years (More Than a Decade)

COOPERATION TYPE: Knowing | Unknowning | Official

CORROBORATION LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document

On August 7, 2023, the Reporting Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 38), a U.S. Military veteran and government attorney who also served as an FBI Intelligence Analyst for more than a decade, provided the following information obtained first-hand from a human source (Codename SIERRA 17):

SOURCE DESCRIPTION

SIERRA 17 is a retired FBI Special Agent. ROMEO PAPA 38 has known SIERRA 17 personally and professionally for more than a decade. SIERRA 17 has been involved in the Central part of the United States conducting background investigations within the past year. This is the initial, first-time report from SIERRA 17 who cooperated unknowingly and who is evaluated as reliable, with direct access to the information reported below.

LOWER STANDARDS

In late Spring 2023, SIERRA 17 said recent applicants for the FBI were not meeting the same standards as compared to earlier cohorts of applicants based on background investigations conducted by SIERRA 17. Specifically, according to SIERRA 17, applicants in the past 1-2 years tended to not have the same physical conditioning nor professional experience as earlier applicants.

LEFT OF CENTER VIEWS

SIERRA 17 opined the FBI is lowering standards to attract a larger pool of candidates with more politically “left of center” views. These candidates, SIERRA 17 said, would not have in previous

years been competitive for FBI employment due to inadequate physical, academic, or professional accomplishment.

INFERIOR CANDIDATES

SIERRA 17 stated that in his/her opinion, the FBI was attracting inferior candidates relative to other federal law enforcement agencies, which represented a significant change from SIERRA 17's past experience.

No additional information was provided.

#####

SOURCE: SIERRA 22

LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS

RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable | Unknown

ACCESS LEVEL: Direct | Indirect | Unknown

REPORTING HISTORY: Initial | # of Years (More Than 30 Years)

COOPERATION TYPE: Knowing | Unknowning | Official

CORROBORATION LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document

On August 15, 2023, the Reporting Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 83), a 25-plus year veteran of the FBI who as a high-ranking senior executive set the bar for professionalism and provided inspired, intelligent leadership for FBI Special Agents and task force members in connection with some of the most significant major cases in the history of the FBI, provided the following information obtained first-hand from a human source (Codename SIERRA 22):

SOURCE DESCRIPTION

SIERRA 22 is a current contract employee of the FBI whose work assignments include handling FBI Applicant matters. ROMEO PAPA 83 said he/she has known SIERRA 22 for more than 30 years. SIERRA 22, according to ROMEO PAPA 83, is known in the office as a hard-working employee, and ROMEO PAPA 83 characterized SIERRA 22 as highly reliable and credible and in a position to know the information provided.

FBI HEADQUARTERS DIRECTIVES

SIERRA 22 said an individual who was recently rejected by a local police department because the individual was found to be unqualified applied for a non-Special Agent position with the FBI. FBI Headquarters, according to SIERRA 22, ordered the individual's FBI applicant investigation to continue despite objections from the FBI Field Office to terminate the individual's FBI application.

SIERRA 22 further stated an individual in his/her 30s who has been unemployed for several years and described as a "gamer" also applied to the FBI. FBI Headquarters, according to SIERRA 22, also ordered this individual's FBI applicant investigation to continue despite objections from the FBI Field Office to terminate the individual's FBI application.

LIFE THERAPY PATIENTS

SIERRA 22 said applicants for both FBI support and FBI Special Agent positions are not shy about including on their applications that they are seeing (mental health care) professionals in “Life Therapy” to work on personal issues. SIERRA 22 described this as commonplace now.

QUESTIONABLE FBI DRESS CODE

SIERRA 22 said you would be hard pressed to think you are in an FBI Office these days. The dress code, according to SIERRA 22, is questionable, and it is not at all uncommon to see beards, nose rings, tattoos, etc.

LAZY WORK ETHIC

SIERRA 22 further stated the vast majority of 20-somethings at the FBI are lazy and don’t want to work.

SIERRA 22’s reaction to his/her observations was that he/she was very down on things at the FBI and believed – paraphrasing here – that the trends listed above will not work for the FBI.

No additional information was provided.

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H. LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT REACTION

SOURCE: SIERRA 95

LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS

RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable | Unknown

ACCESS LEVEL: Direct | Indirect | Unknown

REPORTING HISTORY: Initial | # of Years (20)

COOPERATION TYPE: Knowing | Unknowning | Official

CORROBORATION LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document

On July 19, 2023, the Reporting Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 39), a U.S. Marine Corps veteran and local police officer who later served for more than 20 years as an FBI Special Agent and who now works in support of government law enforcement operations, provided the following information obtained via e-mail from a human source (Codename SIERRA 95):

SOURCE DESCRIPTION

SIERRA 95 served for more than 20 years as an FBI Special Agent. ROMEO PAPA 39 met SIERRA 95 at an in-service training event. They were assigned to different Field Offices, and ROMEO PAPA 39 has known SIERRA 95 as a friend for approximately 20 years. ROMEO PAPA 39 has no doubt about SIERRA 95's authenticity, trustworthiness, or competence.

FBI IS PERSONA NON GRATA

SIERRA 95 stays in contact with several local law enforcement officers with whom he/she worked during active service with the FBI, and SIERRA 95 provided the following information via a 2023 e-mail:

"The fbi has lost almost all credibility locally and likely nationally. Amazingly, I know active duty agents who honestly don't see it. I don't know if it is willful ignorance, naiveté, or some insular quality of the fbi, but I was staggered to hear a local agent had bragged it was his life's mission to hunt down "J-6" offenders. I also know he has since been given the cold shoulder by the PD and shown the door, made to wait in the lobby, etc. . . so some of what

you are saying about local law enforcement would appear to be happening around here. I also know one of the county prosecutors very well, see him regularly, and he tells me that the FBI is PNG in his office. Based on another experience wherein different agents lost his evidence then lied about it. Oh well, you make your bed, you live with the consequences."

No additional information was provided.

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I. SEVEN-YEAR SNAPSHOT OF RANDOM SAMPLING OF APPLICANTS

SOURCE: SIERRA 59

LOCATION: Northern U.S. | Southern U.S. | Eastern U.S. | Western U.S. | OCONUS

RELIABILITY: Reliable | Usually Reliable | Fairly Reliable | Not Usually Reliable | Unreliable | Unknown

ACCESS LEVEL: Direct | Indirect | Unknown

REPORTING HISTORY: Initial | # of Years (7)

COOPERATION TYPE: Knowing | Unknowing | Official

CORROBORATION LEVEL: Consistently | Frequently | Infrequently | Rarely | Never | First Time | Document

On July 25, 2023 and August 10, 2023, the Reporting Person (Codename ROMEO PAPA 73), a 30-plus year veteran of the FBI who led complex criminal investigations and who over the course of more than a decade developed expertise conducting private investigations, provided the following information obtained first-hand from a human source (Codename SIERRA 59):

SOURCE DESCRIPTION

SIERRA 59 served as an FBI Special Agent for more than 20 years and enjoyed an exceptional reputation among his/her peers as a hard-working, detailed oriented and accomplished criminal investigator.

SNAPSHOT OF APPLICANTS

SIERRA 59 provided a snapshot (see summary in the table below) of 64 FBI Special Agent applicants (41 males, 23 females) whose backgrounds were investigated as the final step of the selection process to (1) earn an appointment as a Special Agent of the FBI and (2) receive an invitation to begin New Agent Training at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia.

With the exception of one of the applicants, it was not known how many of the applicants in this sampling - covering a period of approximately seven years - were disqualified, selected for appointment, completed training, or who are currently employed by the FBI.

It should be noted that in the table below, the relatively high number applicants with military backgrounds is attributable to their proximity to major military bases in this particular region.

<u>#</u>	<u>SEX</u>	<u>BACKGROUND</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
1	--	Pursuing Master's Degree, Military	<i>Doesn't pay attention to detail</i>
2	--	Military	
3	--	Auditor/Finance	
4	--	Fast Food Worker, Community Non-Profit	<i>Not qualified. Lied when resigning from the fast-food establishment.</i>
5	--	Security Guard, Engineer	
6	--	Military	<i>Place of Birth Foreign Country</i>
7	--	Teacher	<i>Place of Birth Foreign Country</i>
8	--	Master's Degree, Police Officer	
9	--	Law Degree, Attorney	
10	--	Deputy Sheriff	
11	--	Law Degree, Federal Law Enforcement Officer	
12	--	Pursuing Master's Degree, Military	
13	--	Firefighter, Military	
14	--	Operations Manager, Military	
15	--	Engineer, Military	
16	--	Business Analyst, Sales	
17	--	Military	
18	--	Auditor, Certified Public Account	<i>Prior FBI Experience</i>
19	--	Assistant, Hostess	
20	--	Military, Cashier, Clerk	
21	--	Military, Police Officer	
22	--	Master's Degree	<i>Former supervisor had reservations about recommending applicant. Emotional Issues.</i>
23	--	Military	
24	--	Small Jobs, Military, Unemployed	
25	--	Military, State Trooper	
26	--	Military	
27	--	Marketing, Intel/Financial Analyst	<i>Prior FBI Experience</i>
28	--	Master's & Law Degrees	
29	--	Master's Degree, Military, Police Officer	
30	--	Program Manager	
31	--	Attorney, Military	
32	--	Scientist	
33	--	Pursuing Law Degree, Military	
34	--	Military	
35	--	Master's Degree, Coach	<i>FBI Employee</i>
36	--	Military, EMT, Ph.D. Student	

37	--	Military	
38	--	Personal Trainer, Military	<i>FBI Honors Intern</i>
39	--	Military, Legislative Assistant	<i>Currently Unemployed</i>
40	--	Consultant, Project Manager	<i>Prior Employment/Termination Issues</i>
41	--	(No Information Provided)	<i>Candidate Not Recommended</i>
42	--	Engineer	<i>Strong GPA</i>
43	--	Law Degree, Military, Politics	
44	--	Law Enforcement Officer	
45	--	Military, Police Officer	
46	--	(No Information Provided)	
47	--	Athlete, Police Officer	
48	--	Master's Degree, Forensic Accountant	
49	--	Mechanic, Police Officer	
50	--	Master's Degree, Firefighter	
51	--	Master's Degree, Military, Counterintelligence	
52	--	Accounting	
53	--	Master's Degree, Military, Social Worker, Program Manager, Analyst	
54	--	Military	
55	--	Pursuing Master's Degree, Military, Media	
56	--	Master's Degree, Researcher, Consultant	<i>Speaks Foreign Language</i>
57	--	Master's Degree, Compliance Officer, Police Officer	
58	--	Master's Degree, Research Scientist	
59	--	Pursuing Master's Degree, Military	
60	--	(No Information Provided)	
61	--	(No Information Provided)	
62	--	(No Information Provided)	
63	--	Internet Start-Up Company	
64	--	(No Information Provided)	

SIERRA 59 agreed that while many applicants may look good on paper, it isn't until they are tested during rigorous training and challenges out in the field when their potential, skills as investigators, and value to the agency are known.

SIERRA 59 stated that based on information received from a colleague employed by the FBI with first-hand knowledge, the probationary period for New Agents is two (2) years, including their training time at the FBI Academy. According to SIERRA 59, the probationary period is only one (1) year for New Agents coming in from the military, which also includes their training time at the FBI Academy. SIERRA 59 said the probationary period should be at least two (2) years in the Field for all New Agents because it takes at least that long to determine the agent's true character and integrity.

No additional information was provided.

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APPENDIX A: FBI EMPLOYMENT ELIGIBILITY (DOWNLOADED SEPT. 10, 2023)

(https://fbijobs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-04/guide_eligibility.pdf)



EMPLOYMENT ELIGIBILITY

In order to be eligible for employment with the FBI, applicants must not violate any of the automatic employment disqualifiers and must adhere to the FBI's pre-employment drug policy. Please ensure you meet these standards before submitting an application. All of the disqualifiers highlighted below are extensively researched during the FBI background investigation process.

Employment Disqualifiers

Below are specific elements that will automatically disqualify job candidates for employment with the FBI. These include:

- Non-U.S. citizenship
- Conviction of a felony (special agent candidates only: conviction of a domestic violence misdemeanor or more serious offense)
- Violation of the FBI Employment Drug Policy (please see below for additional details)
- Drug use while holding a clearance
- Default on a student loan insured by the U.S. Government
- Failure of an FBI-administered urinalysis drug test
- Failure to register with the Selective Service System (for males only, exceptions apply – please [click here](#) to find out more)
- Knowingly or willfully engaged in acts or activities designed to overthrow the U.S. government by force
- Failure to pay court ordered child support
- Failure to file federal, state, or local income tax returns

Please note that if you are disqualified by any of the above tests, you are not eligible for employment with the FBI. Please make sure you can meet FBI employment requirements and pass all disqualifiers before you submit an application.

Employment Drug Policy

The FBI is firmly committed to a drug-free workplace. Interested applicants who are currently using illegal drugs, misusing or abusing legal drugs or other substances for illicit purposes at the time of the application process will be found unsuitable for employment. The FBI balances the needs of the organization and the importance of keeping the public integrity necessary to accomplish its law enforcement and intelligence missions by hiring the most qualified candidates. The guidelines are used by all entities in the hiring process to help determine whether an applicant's prior drug use makes them eligible and/or suitable for FBI employment.

A candidate will be found unsuitable for employment and automatically disqualified if they deliberately misrepresents their drug history in connection with their application for employment. Additionally, candidates are automatically disqualified under the following criteria:

Marijuana Usage

Candidates cannot have used marijuana or cannabis in any form (natural or synthetic) and in any location (domestic or foreign) within the one (1) year preceding the date of their application for employment.

Marijuana or cannabis use before the candidate's 18th birthday is not a disqualifier for FBI employment, however. Adjudicative personnel will evaluate the candidate by using the "wholeperson concept."

Dronabinol (sold as Marinol, Syndros, or generic equivalents) is the only pharmaceutical drug containing tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) that the FDA has approved for lawful use with a medical prescription. Candidates cannot present "medical marijuana cards" or other prescriptions as mitigating factors for marijuana or cannabis use.

Illegal Drugs

Candidates cannot have used any illegal drug, other than marijuana, within the ten (10) years preceding the date of the application for employment. Additionally, candidates cannot have sold, distributed, manufactured, or transported any illegal drug or controlled substance without legal authorization.

Prescription Drugs/Legally Obtainable Substances

- Candidates cannot have misused any prescription drug within one (1) year preceding the date of application for employment.
- Candidates cannot have abused any prescription drug or legally obtained substance (e.g., inhalants, solvents, aerosols, etc.) within three (3) years preceding the date of application for employment.
- Candidates cannot have used anabolic steroids without a prescription from a licensed practicing physician within the past ten (10) years preceding the date of the application for employment.
- Finally, candidates cannot have sold, distributed, manufactured, or transported any prescription drug without legal authorization.

before moving forward with employment. The preliminary employment requirements include a polygraph examination; a test for illegal drug use; credit and records checks; and extensive interviews with former and current colleagues, neighbors, friends, professors, etc. Before applying for any FBI position, please make sure that the FBI Employment Disqualifiers do not apply to you.

FBI Background Investigation

All FBI employees must undergo an FBI background investigation to receive an FBI Top Secret security clearance. Once you have received and accepted a conditional job offer, the FBI will initiate an intensive background investigation. You must go through this background investigation, and you must pass,

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APPENDIX B: FBI SPECIAL AGENT FAQ (DOWNLOADED SEPT. 19, 2023)

(https://fbijobs.gov/sites/default/files/2023-03/Special_Agent_FAQ.pdf)



SPECIAL AGENT FAQ

FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

How are special agents assigned to offices and how often are special agents rotated in their assignments?

Flexibility is key at the FBI. You must be prepared and willing to be assigned according to the needs of the FBI. All agents must sign and adhere to a mobility agreement, which states that as a special agent, you accept the possibility of transfer as a condition of your employment. However, once assigned to a field office, new special agents are generally not transferred unless they request voluntary transfer, apply for management positions, or transfer as a result of an emerging or existing critical need.

Upon graduation from the FBI Academy, you will be assigned to one of the FBI's 56 field offices or satellite offices. Roughly one-third of new agents get their first choice.

Ultimately, the mission comes first. While field office position vacancies take priority over all transfer request decisions, the FBI bases transfers on SA office preferences, seniority, budget considerations and mission needs. If an agent's top choice is New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco or San Juan, Puerto Rico, they will have an excellent chance of getting that preferred office assignment. It's also worth noting that, on average, an SA transfers just twice during a 20-year career.

What is the age requirement for applying?

FBI special agents have a mandatory retirement age of 57. In order to achieve the required 20 years of service for retirement, special agents must enter on duty no later than the day before their 37th birthday. Applicants must apply for the special agent position

prior to their 36th birthday to allow adequate time to complete the Special Agent Selection System (SASS). The FBI may disqualify applicants at any time during the process if it is determined that they will reach age 37 before appointment.

Potential exceptions: Applicants with certain prior federal law enforcement service, applicants who are current FBI employees, or preference eligible veterans may qualify for an age waiver.

Are waivers available for applicants 37 and older?

Per Public Law 93-350, enacted July 12, 1974, the Attorney General and the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) set the date immediately preceding one's 37th birthday as the last date for original entry on duty as a law enforcement officer in the Department of Justice.

Waivers are available for preference-eligible veterans who have been discharged or released from active duty from the Armed Forces under honorable conditions (honorable or general discharge). The Member 4 copy of the DD-214 and, in the case of service-connected disabilities, a copy of the SF-15 "Application for 10-Point Veterans' Preference," as well as other applicable documentation to confirm Veterans' Preference eligibility, must be submitted at the time of application.

Military retirees at the rank of Major, Lieutenant Commander or higher are not eligible for preference in appointment unless they are disabled veterans. This does not apply to reservists who will not begin drawing military retired pay until age 60.

Current FBI employees are eligible to apply prior to their 39th birthday and must be appointed and assigned to the FBI Academy no later than one day preceding their 40th birthday.

Age waivers for preference-eligible veterans will be requested only after they successfully complete all phases of the Special Agent Selection System (SASS) and have been favorably adjudicated/cleared for hire. Preference-eligible applicants must still pass all other components of the SASS, including the FBI Physical Fitness Test (PFT) and fitness-for-duty requirements.

More information can be found on our [military and veterans page](#).

Is there a waiver of the bachelor's degree if an applicant has military service?

No. All special agent applicants must have a minimum of a bachelor's degree or higher from a U.S.-accredited college or university.

Will having uncorrected vision or laser surgery disqualify me from applying for the special agent position?

Distant visual acuity, corrected or uncorrected, must meet FBI standards. Special agent applicants need to have at least 20/20 vision in one eye and not worse than 20/40 vision in the other eye. If an individual has a satisfactory history of wearing soft contact lenses for more than one year, and is able to meet correction to 20/20 in one eye and no worse than 20/40 in the other eye, safety concerns are considered mitigated and applicant processing may continue.

If an applicant has had laser eye corrective surgery, a six-month waiting period is required prior to beginning New Agent Training. Applicants must also provide evidence of complete healing by an ophthalmological clinical evaluation.

The policy for color vision allows continuation of applicant processing if those who fail initial color

vision screening are able to successfully complete the Farnsworth D-15 color vision test.

For more information, see our [special agent physical requirements page](#).

How long does the FBI special agent application process take?

The special agent application process generally takes at least one year and often longer, depending upon annual federal funding levels and hiring goals.

The Special Agent Selection System (SASS) — Phase I and Phase II Testing — is based on an applicant's individual competitiveness.

In addition to the Phase I and II testing process, the PFT, the background investigation, and medical evaluation will affect the length of the application process. Each of these items can take a considerable amount of time to complete if an applicant has lived in several areas, has extensive foreign travel, or has held several jobs.

For more information, visit the our [special agent eligibility page](#) to ensure all information needed has been gathered ahead of time.

What kind of training do FBI special agents receive?

All special agents will spend their first 16 weeks at the FBI Academy in Quantico, VA, where they participate in intensive training. During their time at the FBI Academy, trainees live on campus, participate in a variety of training activities and study a wide variety of academic subjects. The FBI Academy curriculum also includes intensive training in physical fitness, defensive tactics, practical application exercises, and the use of firearms.

Over the course of an agent's career, the FBI provides additional training opportunities to keep

them updated on the latest developments in the respective specialty fields.

See more information on the FBI's [training page](#).

Do I need to have a law enforcement or military background to apply to become an FBI special agent? Are certain degrees more desired by the FBI?

A law enforcement or military background is not required. Because of the breadth and scope of the FBI's mission, it looks for candidates with a wide variety of backgrounds, not just law enforcement or military experience. The FBI seeks special agents with any occupation that requires a college degree. Specifically, we look for expertise in physical science, computer science, engineering, architecture, law, accounting, and other disciplines that require logical analysis and critical thinking.

We're also actively seeking special agents who are fluent in critical foreign languages, as well as those with experience in intelligence and counterterrorism work. Study a field you enjoy and, after that, obtain experiences that will demonstrate your ability to master the special agent core competencies, specifically:

- Collaboration
- Communication
- Flexibility and adaptability
- Initiative
- Interpersonal ability
- Leadership
- Organizing and planning
- Problem solving and judgment

Do I have to know how to shoot a gun to apply to be an FBI special agent?

No, it is not necessary to have prior experience with firearms. All special agent trainees receive extensive training in the use and maintenance of firearms and related equipment. In many cases, the best agent trainees are those with no prior firearms experience (since they do not have any ingrained habits).

Are there different physical fitness requirements for women and men?

Although female applicants/trainees take exactly the same Physical Fitness Test (PFT) as their male counterparts, the scoring scale for each event is slightly different in order to account for physiological differences. Learn more about the [physical requirements](#).

What is a typical day like for a special agent of the FBI?

There is no such thing as a typical day for a special agent. One day you could be executing a search warrant and making an arrest, while the next you could be testifying in court. Your morning could entail catching up on paperwork in the office, while the afternoon could bring a meeting with a high-level source. No two days are ever the same for an FBI special agent.

How does the background investigation process work?

Due to the sensitive nature of our mission, all FBI positions require a Top Secret Clearance; a special agent career requires a Top Secret Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) Clearance. Before employees can start work with the FBI, they must

undergo an intensive background investigation that includes a polygraph test, a drug test, credit and records checks, and extensive interviews with former and current colleagues, neighbors, friends, professors, etc., covering the last 10 years or as of their 18th birthday.

Are there any automatic disqualifiers?

Yes. These include:

- Non-U.S. citizenship
- Conviction of a felony (special agent candidates only: conviction of a domestic violence misdemeanor or more serious offense)
- Violation of the FBI Employment Drug Policy (please see our [employment eligibility guide](#) for more information)
- Drug use while holding a clearance
- Default on a student loan insured by the U.S. government
- Failure of an FBI-administered urinalysis drug test
- Failure to register with the Selective Service System (for males only, exceptions apply – please [click here](#) to find out more)
- Knowingly or willfully engaged in acts or activities designed to overthrow the U.S. government by force
- Failure to pay court ordered child support
- Failure to file federal, state, or local income tax returns

How much are FBI special agents paid?

All new FBI special agents will earn salaries at the GL-10 Special Base Rate for Law Enforcement

Officers (LEOs) pay grade. Applicants with no prior government service will earn a salary at the GL-10, Step 1 pay level. Applicants with prior government service (including FBI professional staff) may be eligible to receive higher steps that are commensurate with their highest previous pay, but they will not enter at higher grades.

During the Basic Field Training Course (BFTC), New Agent Trainees (NATs) will earn GL-10 salaries, plus locality pay for the Washington, D.C. area, plus availability pay (AVP), which is 25% of their basic pay (base plus locality). Upon graduation from the BFTC and assignment to their first field offices, new special agents will be paid at the GL-10 pay level, plus the locality pay that applies to their first offices of assignment, plus AVP. The [OPM website](#) contains current salary tables to allow employees to determine the locality pay rates for various areas of the country. Part-time special agents do not receive availability pay.

As an FBI employee, a special agent also receives a variety of benefits, including group health and life insurance programs, vacation and sick pay, and a full retirement plan.

How will having a family affect my career as an FBI special agent?

The FBI has several programs designed to help employees meet both their family and career goals. In addition to our normal annual and sick leave benefits, the federal Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) permits employees to take up to 12 weeks of leave without pay for medical exigencies, including the birth or adoption of a child.

The FBI also offers a part-time program for special agents (agents must have completed the probationary period). This program allows an agent to work between 16 and 32 hours a week, providing extra flexibility to parents. In most instances, the part-time agent's revised work assignment will be determined in such a manner that appropriate

consideration is given by the Division Head to the agent's level of investigative experience, specialized assignments, GS grade, other pertinent skills and the needs of the division.

What are the opportunities for promotions and pay increases?

Special agents enter as GL-10 employees on the [Law Enforcement Government Pay Scale](#) and can advance to the GS-13 grade level in a field, nonsupervisory role. Special agents can thereafter qualify for promotion to supervisory, management and executive positions to grades GS-14 and GS-15, as well as to the FBI Senior Executive Service.

I want to be an FBI "profiler." Where do I begin the application process?

The FBI does not have a job called "profiler." Supervisory special agents assigned to the National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime (NCAVC) at Quantico, VA, perform the tasks commonly associated with "profiling." Despite some popular depictions, these FBI special agents do not get "vibes" or experience "psychic flashes" while walking around fresh crime scenes. In reality, it's an exciting world of investigation and research — a world of inductive and deductive reasoning, crime-solving experience and knowledge of criminal behavior, facts and statistical probabilities.

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APPENDIX C: REQUEST FOR INFORMATION (RFI)

Date of RFI: 8 July 2023

Date Due: 4 August 2023

Subject: Request for Information regarding the success or failure of recent FBI efforts to recruit new Special Agents

Reference: N/A

Background: Since 2000, there have been numerous publicized instances of illegal actions by senior FBI personnel and management of bias and claims of “weaponization” of the FBI against well-known conservative political groups and leaders. These actions involve the entire range of conservative political and social activists, from former president Trump down to individual parents protesting curriculum or policy at school board meetings. These publicly acknowledged actions run the gamut, from acknowledgement of widespread misuse of FISA authorities⁴⁶, to “doctoring” records to secure a FISA warrant⁴⁷, to targeting citizens engaged in First Amendment protected activity with counter-terrorism authorities.^{48, 49} Additionally, the FBI has consistently failed to manage and discipline its personnel in non-politically charged cases.^{50, 51} The widespread violation by the FBI of existing law and DOJ policies was exhaustively documented in the public release of the Durham report, which clearly proves the weaponization of the Bureau against political opponents.⁵²

Preliminary source reporting indicates the widespread nature of this abuse and mismanagement by the FBI may be reducing the number of high-quality candidates applying to join the FBI. If so, this poses a significant potential national security risk to the United States. The FBI is extremely reliant on recruiting highly qualified and skilled personnel to accomplish its mission as the lead intelligence and law enforcement agency in the U.S. for detecting, deterring, and disrupting national security threats to the United States and its interests. A failure to attract, recruit and

⁴⁶ "FISA Reauthorization Met with Deep Bipartisan Skepticism: 'Trust Has Been Lost'." Washington Examiner. Last modified June 14, 2023. <https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/news/justice/fisa-hearing-reveals-uphill-climb-702-reauthorization>.

⁴⁷ "Former FBI Lawyer Pleads Guilty in First Criminal Charge from Durham Probe." CBS News - Breaking News, 24/7 Live Streaming News & Top Stories. Last modified August 19, 2020. <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/former-fbi-lawyer-kevin-clinesmith-pleads-guilty-first-criminal-charge-durham-probe/>.

⁴⁸ "Whistleblowers: FBI Targeted Parents Via Terrorism Tools Despite Garland's Testimony That It Didn't Happen." Fox News. Last modified May 12, 2022. <https://www.foxnews.com/politics/fbi-targeted-parents-via-terrorism-tools-despite-garland-testimony>.

⁴⁹ "Children of Pro-life Activist Arrested in FBI Raid at Home Are 'traumatized,' Wife Says: 'A Lot of Crying'." Fox News. Last modified September 28, 2022. <https://www.foxnews.com/media/children-pro-life-activist-arrested-fbi-raid-home-traumatized-wife-says-crying>.

⁵⁰ "FBI Badly Botched Sex-abuse Probe of USA Gymnastics Doctor, Watchdog Says." Reuters. Last modified July 15, 2021. <https://www.reuters.com/world/us/us-justice-watchdog-release-report-into-fbi-probe-ex-usa-gymnastics-doctor-2021-07-14/>.

⁵¹ The Washington Times <https://www.washingtontimes.com>. "EXCLUSIVE: Agent Misconduct Revealed to Be Recurring Theme at FBI; Attempts at Fixes Fall Short." The Washington Times. Last modified May 19, 2022. <https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2022/may/19/agent-misconduct-revealed-to-be-recurring-theme-at/>.

⁵² Durham, John H. *Report on Matters Related to Intelligence Activities and Investigations Arising Out of the 2016 Presidential Campaigns*. Department of Justice, 2023. <https://www.justice.gov/storage/durhamreport.pdf>.

retain only the highest caliber of applicants would directly and negatively affect the ability of the FBI to accomplish this vital mission.

To assist in determining whether and to what degree recent FBI misconduct has affected recruitment and retention, **UNCLASSIFIED** information addressing, in whole or in part, the following questions is requested:

Question #	Information Sought	Notes	Date Request	Date Due
1	Documents, reports, or anecdotes establishing the formal or informal FBI recruiting standards since 2016 or showing how those standards have changed during that time	UNCLASS only.	7 July 2023	4 August 2023
2	Documents, reports, or anecdotes showing whether the FBI has or has not met recruiting standards since 2016, and the cost of recruiting per candidate accepted and/or completion of SA training.	UNCLASS only.	7 July 2023	4 August 2023
3	Documents, reports, or anecdotes addressing first year attrition/failure to complete new agent training	UNCLASS only.	7 July 2023	4 August 2023
4	Documents, reports, or anecdotes addressing attrition at any or all of the following career points: the 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 15-year marks.	UNCLASS only.	7 July 2023	4 August 2023
5	Documents, reports, or anecdotes addressing professional background/educational achievement/average GPA/military service/candidate experience of Special Agent hires since 2016	UNCLASS only.	7 July 2023	4 August 2023
6	Documents, reports, or anecdotes addressing formal performance evaluation of Special Agent hires since 2016. Note: this is not for individual SA's, but for office or Bureau-wide. Can include special awards, etc.	UNCLASS only.	7 July 2023	4 August 2023
7	Documents, reports, or anecdotes addressing the number of applicants per position for Special Agents and/or the selection ratio of applicants since 2016	UNCLASS only.	7 July 2023	4 August 2023
8	Documents, reports, or anecdotes addressing the offer acceptance rate for Special Agent applicants (i.e., the number of applicants offered a slot at Quantico with the number accepted)	UNCLASS only.	7 July 2023	4 August 2023

Directions on where and how to submit your source reporting will be provided in a separate communication.

Notes: **Your source(s) can remain anonymous.**

For each source, to aid in evaluating their information please characterize the source as to their reliability, level of access, reporting history, level of cooperation and corroboration, and willingness to be recontacted in accordance

with the criteria on the tables below. If the source is a document, and the document is provided, please characterize the source as a “document”. If the document cannot be provided, characterize the source providing the information about the document:

RELIABILITY

Reliable	No doubt about the source's authenticity, trustworthiness, or competency. History of complete reliability.
Usually reliable	Minor doubts. History of mostly valid information.
Fairly reliable	Doubts. Provided valid information in the past.
Not usually reliable	Significant doubts. Provided valid information in the past.
Unreliable	Lacks authenticity, trustworthiness, and competency. History of invalid information.
Unknown	Insufficient information to evaluate reliability. May or may not be reliable.

LEVEL OF ACCESS

Direct	The source has first-hand knowledge of the information provided
Indirect	The source has second- or third-hand knowledge or access to the information provided
Unknown	The source obtained the information through an uncertain chain of custody or sources.

REPORTING HISTORY

Initial	This is the first report from this source
# of years	The number of years the source has provided information (Example: agent has used source for 12 years)

TYPE OF COOPERATION

Knowing	The source is responding to a direct request for the information, even if they do not know the reason for the request
Unknowing	The source is not responding to a request for the information or is otherwise unaware they have provided the information. For example, the source is overheard giving the reported information
Official	The source is providing the information as part of their official duties. For example, an official briefing or training class

LEVEL OF CORROBORATION

Consistently	Prior reporting from the source has been corroborated +75% of the time
Frequently	Prior reporting from the source has been corroborated 50-75% of the time
Infrequently	Prior reporting from the source has been corroborated 30-50% of the time
Rarely	Prior reporting from the source has been corroborated less than 30% of the time
Never	This source has never provided corroborated information
First Time	This is first time reporting which has not yet been corroborated
Document	This information is from a document which was provided to the collector.

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END OF REPORT